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

Pierotti

THE ARMAGEDDON BLUFF

Dr. Kissinger's Strategy For Winning Mr. Nixon's War

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FUTURE OF A SUBCONTINENT

PUNJAB, BENGAL AND THE GREEN REVOLUTION

Richard Critchfield

Alexander Laing's American Ships

Stephen G. Nichols, Jr.

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LETTERS

Di Prima's rhetoric

New York City

DEAR SIRS: David Rosenthal, in his reveiw of Diane di Prima's *Revolutionary Letters* [*The Nation,* Jan. 3] makes several good points about the stylistic deficiencies and the general mindlessness of this and so much other "revolutionary" poetry, with its Weatherman rhetoric. But I wish Mr. Rosenthal and other critics of the New Left would recognize the true nature of the "revolutionary" complaint against Western civilization, the gravamen of which is not anti-intellectualism but anti-*reductionism.* I define reductionism as the tendency to reduce all ideas to mathematically quantifiable data—the attempt to shoehorn reality into conveniently tautological molds.

People like Ms di Prima are reacting massively to this misuse of the intellect—without a clear realization of what, precisely, they're reacting against, and with a concomitant tendency to condemn rationality in *any* form. Accordingly, I think it's very necessary for Mr. Rosenthal and others who hint at "ecstatic fascism" in critiques of the New Left to understand and express this gut issue. "Fascism" is, in some contexts, nothing but a shibboleth—and a dangerously misleading one.

Alan Bahr

lesser criminal

University City, Mo.

DEAR SIRS: To those who suggest running a black candidate for President, the Powell and Rehnquist confirmations provide a cogent answer. Because Humphrey lost, we now have four destructive conservatives and racists on the Supreme Court, men who probably will damage the nation for a generation to come. Last time I voted for Dick Gregory, believing it unthinkable to support a war criminal like Humphrey. Now Nixon has impressed a truth upon us: there are degrees of evil that extend beyond complicity in mass murder. If voting for a black candidate would come at Humphrey's expense in 1972, I say by all means let's vote for the criminal.

Arthur M. Solomon

Hoffa's ordeal

Toronto, Canada

DEAR SIRS: What is now clear beyond peradventure is that James Hoffa was subjected to harassing prosecutions, the mere number of which tended to deprive him of an opportunity of making a defense, and that in this process he was subjected to extensive electronic surveillance and infiltration of his inner circles by government informers. . . . On securing a preordained conviction, Mr. Hoffa—as reported in the press in the early days of his imprisonment—was kept in a cell, lit every second of the day and night by an electric bulb, and subsequently—as was made known upon his release—in some form of cage. It is revealing of the warped psychology of the jailers masquerading as "correctional personnel," that the prison spokesmen should deny inflicting this torture at the behest of highly placed personages in Washington and describe it instead as a routine part of prison classification and rehabilitation.

The complicity of the liberal establishment in this sadistic abuse of a human being provides the final touch to a story of horror, ended at long last by a surprise reprieve by the Nixon Administration.

Richard Arens,
Prof. of Criminal Law and Criminology,
University of Toronto

The Nation never acceded to the campaign against Hoffa—see "The Hoffa Trial" by Fred J. Cook, issue of April 27, 1964—but we do not share Mr. Arens' view that the reprieve was a "surprise." *The Editors*

EDITORIALS

What Now, Coach?

President Nixon is so avid a football fan that he sends in proposed plays to professional football coaches—in one case placing a telephone call at 1:30 A.M. Humoring the President is of course *de rigueur*, and the Miami Dolphins had little choice but to try the play he submitted to them. It was a flop.

Mr. Nixon also talks a lot about "game plans" in economics, which should rate higher than football in Presidential concern. Now that he has announced himself a convert to Keynesism, how is *that* game plan working? Not very well, unfortunately. The wholesale price index jumped 0.8 per cent, following expiration of the ninety-day wage-price freeze. Some rise was expected, but a figure of nearly 1 per cent is ominous, since retail prices normally follow wholesale prices upwards, and sometimes by an even larger percentage. Unemployment is similarly baleful at 6.1 per cent. And that figure is deceptive: the rate is much higher for some groups than for others. Only in one sector is the outlook favorable and no crystal ball is required to guess where—in profits, for which the President has always shown solicitude. So, even if business picks up and inflation finally levels off, the tough, resistant issue of jobs will remain to plague Mr. Nixon.

Some economists with good records as forecasters believe that we are in the process of accepting 5 per cent unemployment as "full" employment. Richard A. Nenneman, *The Christian Science Monitor*'s business and financial editor, harps on this prospect. He is convincing partly because he is objective; he doesn't have it in for Mr. Nixon by any means. "The attempts of the Nixon economists," he writes, "to restore order to the economy, and to wring out inflation, have been both a necessity and to a large extent a success." Unemployment, however, is another matter. Nenneman quotes Robert Theobald, well known to *Nation* readers, as suggesting that the Administration might as well drop full employment as one of its economic goals; it just isn't going to come again.

Theobald bases his melancholy conclusion largely on the relentless progress of cybernetics. When he first voiced his theory, he found few to agree with him. Automation would generate employment, many economists argued, not diminish it. With the escalation of the Vietnamese War, the economy did indeed zoom and unemployment seemed no great menace. The optimists rejoiced, but not for long.

Naturally the coach in the White House must do things, especially in an election year. He went to San Diego and, amid cheers, dispensed a $54.6 million contract for three oil tankers. He called on Congress to appropriate $5.5 billion for the space shuttle program. That will be popular in the state of Washington, where Mr. Nixon's prospects are none too good.

The one thing he will not push is direct federal employment of the jobless in much needed and socially worthy service capacities. He avoids that because, once started, it would be hard to stop; and because, as he and his advisers see it, a high level of unemployment is essential to control inflation. In plain terms, that means he will use the poor and lower-middle-class wage earners to stabilize

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future prices. As Secretary-Treasurer James J. Matles of the United Electrical Workers puts it, "Having made the millions of jobless pay the price for reducing inflation before the freeze, the Administration has turned on the employed wage earners with its freeze and wage controls and is making them pay heavily for any further reduction in inflation." All this is aggravated by the widening income gap. The lowest fifth of U.S. families get only 3.2 per cent of national income; the highest fifth get 45.8 per cent—fifteen times as much. Taxation runs to the same effect.

Coach Nixon probably does not yearn for any advice from us, but we will nevertheless submit a few plays for him: (*1*) Revamp the tax system. (*2*) Advocate a tough excess profits tax. (*3*) Put at least some of the jobless to work on useful federal projects. (*4*) Initiate heavy cutbacks in military and space spending. Being Richard Nixon, he will do none of these things, unless future events should leave him no choice.

Fade-Out

After Kenneth Reich did his piece on the My Lai massacre trial for *The Nation* (November 1, 1971), his home paper, the *Los Angeles Times,* gave him an assignment, space unlimited, on the same topic. The result was a brilliant roundup, "Lesson of My Lai" which, in about eight newspaper columns, covers the subject from the beginning to its present inconclusive state.

The result of all the investigations and courts-martial, as everyone now knows, is a few demotions and a sentence of twenty years imposed on Lieut. William L. Calley, Jr., whose case remains on appeal while he is under comfortable house arrest at Fort Benning, Ga. President Nixon, who released Calley from the stockade immediately after his conviction, will finally decide what, if any, punishment is to be imposed.

Reich begins his story with a highly significant observation by Capt. Franklin R. Wurtzel, the prosecutor in several My Lai cases. Wurtzel points out that no one involved in the massacre was ever charged under Article 18 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This section deals with courts-martial for violations of "the laws of war"—war crimes, violations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions and the Nuremberg Principles. "It was more palatable, I suppose," Wurtzel said, "to consider the violations as straight homicide rather than war crimes."

One must be deeply suspicious of the reluctance of the Department of Defense to use the war crimes approach. Procedural problems were its excuse, but if there had been a will, surely a way could have been found which would have included firm due-process safeguards. Several outstanding legal experts, in fact, offered cogent advice on this score. Instead the charge was "murder," in the key case, with all its hateful resonance, and the certainty of arousing adverse public reaction. In retrospect it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the army feared the precedent that might have been established if the Nuremberg Principles, in particular, had been invoked. How high up might such a proceeding have reached?

Then there is the mystery of the Peers Report. Where is it? What does it say? Why has it not been made public? *The New Yorker* is running a two-part series by Seymour

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Hersh, who has apparently seen the report or a summary of it. Even if this document is not totally candid—hardly a gratuitous suspicion in view of the circumstances surrounding the army's handling of the whole My Lai affair—it would serve the public interest to release it and let the media and the public judge.

Hersh asserts that army records show that another unit in the same action killed about 100 civilians at My Khe, a nearby hamlet, and that at My Lai 347 civilians were killed. If *two* massacres occurred, perpetrated by *two* units separated by only a short distance, it follows, one would think, that there was something fearfully wrong with the orders covering both actions.

The actual significance of the public outburst in Calley's favor is difficult to judge, in view of the army's handling of the investigations and the trials, and the dilatory reporting by the media. Although the massacres must have been notorious, the media failed to turn up the story initially. But once it did break, there was massive coverage, principally by the electronic media. Even the President harkened to the outcry—while it lasted. But the subsequent proceedings were so long drawn out, and the initial results so largely negative, that the public grew tired of the whole disagreeable business. And the media, sensing the public mood, permitted the story to fade out. But it would be compounding the crime if the public were to be permitted to escape the necessity of facing the facts and of being forced to acknowledge that the military, in a desperate effort to win a war in which we should never have been engaged, ordered the commission of atrocious crimes. If for this reason alone, the Peers Report should be made public. Its release now would not prejudice the rights of any of those originally charged.

Up Against Ma Bell

The New York Public Service Commission's action in approving a $160 million increase in phone rates, although the commission's own examiners recommended only an increase of $50 million, adds insult to injury. For this increase comes on top of an increase of $190 million ordered in July, making a total of $350.6 million which the supine and ludricrously ineffective PSC admits is "distressingly large." The total increase will now give Ma Bell a return of 8.23 per cent on capital investment in intrastate service—which, incidentally, continues to be vile.

But that is only part of the story. Since early summer, 38,000 members of the twenty-three New York City locals of the Communications Workers have been on strike. Until quite recently, when some of the strikers in frustration and anger staged a demonstration in the midtown area, the strike had not been well reported by the New York press, with one exception. CBS News, with Charles Crawford narrating, recently presented an excellent two-part sequence on the strike. A model of fairness, it also showed that television is capable of fine investigative reporting when it turns a good reporter loose on a major story.

The series demonstrates that the phone company has each day brought into New York City from outlying areas—principally upstate New York and New Jersey—between 1,000 and 1,500 supervisory employees who have been trained over the years to act as strikebreakers. These middle-class scabs are housed in various hotels, at what must be enormous expense, and transported into and out of the city under guard. Personnel is rotated, so as to conceal the identity of the scabs. Strikebreakers are routed from one hotel to another to throw the unions off the scent. These are "management teams" which, with increased automation, have enabled the company to ride out the strike for the last six months. The strike is costing the company and the unions as much as $1 million a day. The company doesn't care; with the PSC in its pocket, it will have little difficulty in recapturing the costs from its customers. Just how the union replenishes its strike fund is not clear. And the customers will not be reimbursed.

Most of the strikers are skilled workers, but the range of skills is narrow and there are few jobs in the general market for which these skills would be relevant. As a group they are not militant unionists, but they are beginning to get angry at the treatment they have received; it might best be described as brutal indifference. The strike developed when the New York City locals refused to ratify a nationwide agreement which the union had negotiated with the company. The national leadership of the union supports the strike, but it cannot be said that its support is very visible or emphatic.

Against the background of this ugly strike, the increase in phone rates approved by the PSC is an affront to reason and social decency. Fortunately, there is some evidence of a stiffening resolve in the Congress to find out, once and for all, if Ma Bell is too big to be investigated. If it cannot be investigated—and the FCC confesses that it lacks funds to make a real audit—then obviously it cannot be regulated, and certainly not by state commissions. Sen. Fred Harris, along with Representatives Ryan (D., N.Y.), Kastenmeier (D., Wis.) and Patman (D., Texas) are urging appropriations to make possible a thorough investigation.

We urge approval of the largest of these requests and suggest that the appropriate committees hear spokesmen from the Harlem Consumer Education Council, Inc., which has been waging an uphill fight against the rate increases for the last three years.

The Military-Industrial Shuttle

Back in 1961 Fred J. Cook did a special issue for us on the military-industrial complex. Later published in book form as *The Warfare State,* it was the first thorough exploration of the subject. There was some eyebrow lifting over Cook's accounts of generals, admirals and lesser military grades collecting their retirement pay and drifting into one or another of the big defense contracting companies. The conflict of interest was clearly delineated, but at the time few considered it worth Congressional notice.

Still, as evidence of malpractice accumulated, a survey had to be made for the Congress, and some measures were initiated to prevent, or at least diminish, the more flagrant abuses. The survey showed that 993 officers above the rank of major, and 108 high-level Pentagon civilians, had moved into defense industry jobs in the three previous fiscal years. Until now it has been hard to keep track of such job hopping, but under a new law the Pentagon is required to issue a census each year naming the companies where former officers work and specifying the nature of their

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employment. The reverse flow of men moving from defense companies into the Pentagon is likewise published.

Some slight obstacles are put in the way of would-be transgressors. A retired officer is prohibited from selling directly to the military service in which he holds retired status. He may sell to other branches of the Defense Department only after a three-year waiting period. The loopholes in this law are obvious. Senator Proxmire and other critics of the Defense establishment point out that ex-officers can sell indirectly by hiding behind innocuous-sounding titles and selling by proxy.

Another interesting phase of the connection between industry and the military is described by Leonard Sloane in the January 16 *New York Times*. Large corporations used to recruit directly on campus, but at some institutions student militants made things tough for the recruiters. Now many big firms (Bell Telephone Laboratories, Johnson & Johnson, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Pfizer, Bankers Trust and Continental Can are cited) woo junior military officers who have discharged their obligations to the government. Small companies do the same.

The reason is stated by Robert W. Brooksbank, manager of college relations for the Mobil Oil Corporation: "These men have a good threshold, particularly in sales jobs . . . they have good command presence and they come through strong as solid citizens with whom a person can identify." Last year Mobil Oil hired about twenty-five military men and will probably double the number this year. At Procter & Gamble 35 per cent of the college-trained "hired" last year came out of the services. Bell took on 100 junior officers in the last two years.

In short, the military-industrial complex continues to flourish. Whether the country benefits by such interlocks is at least moot, but the military on the one hand, and industry on the other, are interested in their own problems. Big bureaucracies, whether civilian or military, breed certain types and at the same time create the need for them, so that what was formerly a random relationship tends to become institutionalized. On this basis, West Point, Annapolis and the Air Force Academy should begin offering courses in cost accounting, management, selling and the like so as to ease the transition from the military finishing schools to cushy jobs in business.

Landmark in Richmond

Federal District Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr.'s decision ordering the creation within thirty days of a single school district for Richmond, Va., and the merger of the existing three public school districts within three months, is obviously a landmark decision. In theory, it outlaws *de facto* segregation in much the same way that *Brown* vs. *Board of Education* outlawed *de jure* segregation in 1954. The factual background is simple: about 70 per cent of metropolitan Richmond's public school children are black and about 90 per cent of the children in the two suburban districts are white. The school board must now consolidate the three districts, thus making it possible for the court to approve—and enforce—a sensible desegregation plan. The 325-page decision, product of three months of intensive study following a twenty-two-day hearing in August, is not surprising. Seven years ago, Judge J. Skelly Wright of the U.S. Court of Appeals told a New York University audience that it was "inconceivable" that the Supreme Court would "long sit idly by, watching Negro children crowded into inferior slum schools while whites flee to the suburbs to place their children in vastly superior, predominantly white schools." He said then that the federal courts would have to act "if the problem persists and the states fail to correct the evil."

In a remarkable passage Judge Merhige sums up his thinking: "It is indeed a sad commentary that by reason of the tenacity with which state and local officials have clung to the ways of the past in an effort to keep the races apart in one of the most important functions of government, i.e., the education of our children, that thousands and thousands of words have been written in judicial literature, when to this Court the following language, interpreted in the manner in which it was intended to be interpreted—that is, giving effect to the ordinary meaning of the language contained therein—bespeaks it all." He then quotes the sweeping affirmations of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which is perhaps the high point of the American credo.

The fate of this remarkable decision in the Supreme Court is uncertain, but whatever happens, the runaway game that suburban communities have played in an effort to avoid the law of the land is drawing to a close. For Judge Merhige's decision is merely one of numerous pressures which are undermining suburban isolation. Plans for merger of city and suburban school districts are under consideration in Indianapolis, Detroit, Grand Rapids, Hartford and other cities. The California Supreme Court's 6-to-1 decision in the Serrano case, which upset that state's present methods of financing public schools, is another pressure. "This funding scheme," the court said, "invidiously discriminates against the poor because it makes the quality of a child's education a function of the wealth of his parents." That sentence also bespeaks a lot.

Still another pressure is for public housing projects in suburban communities, with or without their approval. Then too desegregation is making more headway in the South than many had believed possible. For the first time the North now has more black children in segregated schools than does the South. As attention shifts from the South, pressures are beginning to mount in the North and West to reverse the drift to total isolation of black children in the public schools. Despite the wretched record of the Nixon Administration on civil rights, a preponderant *national* opinion will never approve the emergence of a totally segregated public school system on the South African or apartheid model. Moreover, techniques of achieving desegregation have been defined. A confidential study of HEW, to be released in March, demonstrates the feasibility of ending school desegregation in forty-four of the nation's cities. The report concludes that desegregation is a political, not a technical problem. Finally, it is becoming difficult to extend the range of suburban commuting much further, the more so as industry is now pursuing fleeing commuters to the existing suburbs. Seen in this perspective, Judge Merhige's decision is indeed a landmark on the long road toward achievement of the historic goal of universal civic freedom which Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment projected.

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FUTURE OF A SUBCONTINENT

Punjab, Bengal & the Green Revolution

RICHARD CRITCHFIELD
Mr. Critchfield is on leave from the editorial staff of the Washington Star. *He covered the Vietnamese War for the* Star *from 1964 to 1967. He is the author of* The Long Charade: Political Subversion in the Vietnam War.

Indira Gandhi has changed the political map of the Indian subcontinent, but she has not changed the villagers of Bengal and the Punjab nor the way they grow their food. The emergence of Bangladesh as a separate country has been widely interpreted as the beginning of a three-way power struggle for southern Asia, with the Russians the winners of the first round and the Chinese and the Americans the losers. It can also be seen, perhaps more realistically, as the most dramatic episode thus far in a slide toward social chaos and savage struggles to hold or seize in both Bengal and the Punjab resources that have been made even scarcer by the complex forces of overpopulation, cultural uprooting and rapid agricultural change.

The triggering mechanism seems to have been the successful adoption in the past five years of American farm technology in northern India and Pakistan. The newly introduced dwarf, short-stemmed wheat and rice can triple harvests since they can be heavily fertilized with nitrogen without collapsing under the weight of the heads. These new strains have brought both India and Pakistan close to self-sufficiency in food for the first time in thirty years, but because of a lack of social leveling, both between the region of the Punjab and Bengal, and between the rural rich and poor within each region, it has caused a series of political explosions which are only beginning.

Chances are that extremely leftist dictatorial governments, not much influenced by either Moscow or Peking, will eventually emerge in Bengal and the Punjab. The Chinese stand to reap gratuitous benefits, gaining recruits for Maoist revolutionary movements from the multitudes of dispossessed peasants, but they will be preoccupied by overwhelming problems at home as their own population nears 1 billion in the 1970s. The Russians are handicapped in poor, agricultural countries because they persist rigidly in trying to transfer their own experience of moving directly into rapid industrialization without first putting food production on a sound basis. Of the three great powers, only the Americans possess the vital agricultural technology.

While the recent focus of attention has been on Bengal, what happens in the Punjab, closer to the real heartland of the subcontinent, will probably be more pivotal. To take each region in turn:

The Punjab is a broad, flat and fertile plain reaching from the headwaters of the Ganges north of Delhi up to the foothills of the Himalayas and the Hindu Kush near Peshawar. Its name means "land of the five rivers," for it extends across five rivers that come together to form the Indus, where man, probably migrating from Mesopotamia, created at Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro one of the first river valley civilizations. In the 1947 partition of India, the Punjab, like Bengal, was about equally divided between India and Pakistan.

Most of today's Punjabis are descended from the Scythian warrior tribes of central Asia who did not enter India until the time of Caesar and did not seize all the Punjab's villages south to Delhi until 100 years ago. Despite the passage of centuries, they have kept the rough Scythian warrior spirit, glorying unabashedly in strength of arms, the destruction of their foes and the number of their cattle. Unlike the Bengalis, they never came under the domination of the priests and holy men of the Gangetic plain, who managed elsewhere on the subcontinent to set the whole life-negating tone of Indian intellectual life.

Today the Punjabis are divided about equally into Indians and Pakistanis, and further divided by religion into Sikhs, Moslems and Hindus. Although Punjabis form the bulk of the Indian and Pakistani armies and have now gone to war against each other three times in twenty-four years, they are physically and culturally very different from the rest of the Indians. A strong sense of shared identity persists, as was evident in the favorable treatment captured Pakistani soldiers received from their fellow Punjabis in the Indian army.

Despite its rivers, the Punjab receives only 5 to 15 inches of rainfall a year. The British irrigated this virtual desert with canals which, by the 1930s, served 12.4 million acres. Punjabis were colonized by the British on 25-acre farms and the Punjab became the breadbasket of India. But its population rose 50 per cent within a generation and by World War II the region had an average grain surplus of only 5 per cent. The Punjab was sinking back toward stagnation and subsistence farming when, along with Bengal, it was the scene of the partition holocaust of 1947, 6 million Punjabis and Bengalis being uprooted and another million dying in the exchange of populations.

The restoration of the Punjab's agriculture began in the 1950s when the Indian and Pakistani Governments both invested heavily in massive hydroelectric projects, introduced rural electrification and subsidized the sinking of hundreds of thousands of tubewells. The truly spectacular transformation, with the new seeds, heavy use of nitrogen fertilizer, tractors, threshing machines and combines giving the Punjab a per acre wheat output nine times higher than that of Kansas, has come only in the last five years, and has somehow escaped general attention.

The decline of Bengali agriculture and disintegration of the Bengali village began, as in Punjab, in the 1940s, but it has never been arrested. The problem has not been too little water but too much. The floodwaters of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra are two-and-a-half times greater than those of the Mississippi and the Missouri; some 60 per cent of the region goes under water during the summer monsoon.

In some of Bengal's most densely populated districts,

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such as Noahkhali and Comila, a steady regression in methods of cultivation has been going on now for two generations. No Bengali landholding of less than 1.5 acres can support a pair of bullocks, and the average farm size of 1.7 acres conceals the reality that half the holdings are less than half an acre. Bengal has therefore undergone a steady retreat from oxen-pulled plows to primitive hand hoes, an agricultural revolution in reverse. The psychological effect of such dense overcrowding and technological regression has never been fully studied, but Noahkhali will be remembered as the scene of Mahatma Gandhi's last pilgrimage; he went there hoping to prevent a slaughter of Moslems and Hindus that, together with similar fighting in the Punjab, cost 1 million lives.

The death toll in last December's fourteen-day war is estimated to be between 10,000 and 20,000, including soldiers and civilians, but no one knows how many died in the march of 10 million refugees to India or how safe from continued reprisals are the million or so Moslem Biharis and a small number of Punjabis who settled in East Bengal after the 1947 partition. The overall death toll may go beyond 1 million, or close to that in the Indonesian anti-Communist massacre of 1966, which also was in part a struggle for land in grossly overpopulated villages.

In both the Eastern and Western halves of Bengal during the past five years there has been a steady growth of movements by dispossessed peasants, who lack bullocks, money, land or hope, to seize land by force. These Naxalite gangs, named after the village where the land-grab movement began, roam about, killing, looting and condemning landlords by "people's courts" on the old Chinese pattern. Until recently, they defined a "landlord" as a peasant with more than 5 acres. Now the standard is down to 3 acres.

The Mukti Bahini, Bangladesh's new army, is commanded by professional officers, but it numbers at most 100,000 men, the bulk of whom are young civilians, and it cannot hope to police the villages where most of the 70 million East Bengalis live. The army is also reportedly infiltrated with Awami League extremists far to the left of the new Bangladesh Government, and a wholesale bloodbath and movement to seize land in the countryside, directed especially against the Razakars who collaborated with the West Pakistani Government, may be hard to stop.

Mrs. Gandhi has appointed D. P. Dhar, one of her three closest advisers and a former ambassador to Moscow (during the recent war, he was the chief liaison man with the Kremlin), as India's special envoy to Bangladesh. I knew Dhar well when, as Home Minister in the Vale of Kashmir he functioned for many years as a virtual colonial overlord—a role he will probably fill now in Bangladesh. He is strongly pro-Soviet, but unless he has a capable Bangladesh Government to work with, he and his Russian friends may find themselves very exposed.

The obvious danger facing India is that East Bengali Marxists, owing allegiance neither to Moscow nor Peking,



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will succeed in capturing the leadership of the secessionist battle. From March until now, there has been an apparently deliberate effort to destroy the ability of the Bengalis to organize, since not only moderate Bengali politicians, intellectuals, officials and other potential leaders have been murdered but even rank-and-file policemen and similarly humble people in the administrative machinery. The blame for this has been variously put on the Pakistanis and the Moslem fanatic forces, but the chief benefactor would seem to be the Marxists.

If the Marxists and other guerrilla groups which stand far to the left of either the Bangladesh Government or the orthodox pro-Russian Communists should manange to prolong the chaos, the long-term possibility would then be that they would join with the Marxists of West Bengal in an attempt to unite the two Bengals in a new, independent and revolutionary state.

It was the fear of this development, which would cut off oil-rich Assam and Calcutta's jute industry from the rest of India, as much as the ruinous financial burden of maintaining the 10 million refugees, that probably prompted Mrs. Gandhi's intervention. Her basic interest since March has been to help East Bengal's middle class to survive politically, and to prevent violent revolutionaries from taking over and teaming up with India's Calcutta-based Bengali Marxists.

Since 1967, Calcutta and West Bengal have undergone spasms of chaos, sponsored by the Marxist-controlled state government, which, replaced for short periods by direct rule from Delhi, has always been reinstalled by the local voters. The purpose of this violence—Calcutta has averaged six to eight political murders a day in the past year—has been to increase the Marxists' power. The inflow of 10 million refugees and the war have helped this effort and one can predict that the same tactics will now be used in Bangladesh.

Resentment by East Bengalis of Punjabi rule has been so open and longstanding that it is sometimes asked why former President Yahya Khan agreed last year to hold Pakistan's first general elections in its twenty-three-year history, since it seemed inevitable that the Bengalis would make autonomy the issue.

To understand his action, one must retrace the history of the subcontinent's agricultural revolution, why it came so fast and why it produced the riots in early 1969 that brought down General Ayub Khan's government and forced Yahya Khan to agree to elections as the only means of insuring his military government's survival.

In late 1964, the U.S. State Department's Policy Planning Council, headed by Walt W. Rostow, presented President Johnson with a study which found that the Malthusian crisis of population outstripping resources would hit the area in the mid-1970s unless something was done to prevent it. By then the American aid effort, begun under the Truman administration's Point Four Program in 1947, had achieved some success in Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, Mexico, Israel, Peru and elsewhere. But in India and Pakistan, whose 700 million people outnumbered the total population of the rest of non-Communist Asia, Africa and Latin America combined, the results had been disappointing. A Fabian Socialist schooled in the economics of Harold Laski, Jawaharlal Nehru paid little attention to agriculture and instead used American food aid to feed his restless cities and hold down prices, while he pressed forward with rapid, state-managed industrialization. When Congress blocked funds pledged by President Kennedy for the $1 billion Bokaro steel works in 1963, Nehru turned to the Russians to build it, setting in train an increasing reliance on Moscow.

At the time, Nehru told me, "Everything depends on steel. It is basic to our development." In this interview, held not long before his death, Nehru complained that, while American aid "aimed at making India self-sufficient," the amount given was only enough "to keep the country from collapsing" and not enough for it to reach self-sustained growth.

During the two decades before World War II, India, like other Asian countries, had exported its surplus grain, mostly from the Punjab, to Europe. After the war, it joined other poor countries as an importer. By 1960, the net grain export to the poor countries from the United States was 19 million tons a year; by 1966, it was 36 million tons, with India taking a third. As Orville Freeman, Agriculture Secretary to Kennedy and Johnson, told me in 1969, "Food was used as a disposable item, with little regard for its effect on demand and prices."

After the first Indian-Pakistani war, when both countries suffered consecutive monsoon failures in 1965 and 1966, President Johnson responded with a "short-tether" policy of supplying food aid only for a few months at a time and tying it to specific action by recipients to grow more food of their own. Freeman was sent to India to negotiate an agreement with its Agriculture Minister, C. Subramanium, who needed leverage to get a shift in investment priorities through India's ruling Congress Party. This American pressure worked.

Nehru died in May 1964, just a few months before the new dwarf wheat and rice seeds were planted on 200 test acres in Asia. By 1969, the seeds were sown on 34 million acres in a belt stretching from Morocco to Java, but mostly in India and Pakistan. In the tropics, wheat and rice had been examples of Darwin's natural selection: the surviving strains had been tall, thin-strawed plants, able to keep their heads above water if flooded and to compete with weeds for their share of sunlight. When fertilized, they tended to become top-heavy and to fall over before the grain ripened.

The Japanese isolated a dwarfing gene which produced a sturdy, short-strawed wheat capable of carrying a heavy head of grain. The dwarfing gene was brought to the United States in 1947 and later incorporated with local breeding strains to produce a successful dwarf variety which had world-record yields in the Pacific Northwest. The major breakthrough finally came in Mexico, when Dr. Norman Borlaug, who has since won the Nobel Prize, produced a dwarf wheat adapted to Indian and Pakistani growing conditions. In 1962, the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations joined forces in the Philippines to produce a similar dwarf rice. India imported 250 tons of the new Mexican wheat seed in the 1965 crop year and 18,000 tons in 1966; Pakistan imported 350 tons in 1965 and 40,000 tons in 1967. The green revolution was on.

Between 1967 and the eve of the Bengali war, the

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Pakistani Punjab doubled its wheat harvest in the most spectacular advance in grain production in human history. A record rice harvest also brought Pakistan into the market as an exporter. Across the frontier, India did almost as well, its wheat production climbing 50 per cent between 1965 and 1969; mostly because of increases in the Punjab, India will probably become self-sufficient in grain next year, ending its long dependency on U.S. surpluses.

In a purely technological sense, the transformation of the Punjab's wheat production was a great success story. Together with Ayub Khan's policy of giving private enterprise its head, it put Pakistan in seventh place, just after Spain, in the rate of growth of its gross national production. Last year the dwarf wheat was planted on 10 million of Pakistan's 15 million irrigated acres; 70,000 tractors, 7,000 threshing machines and more than 100 combines have appeared in just the last two to three years in the Punjabi fields.

As early as 1969 I heard predictions at World Bank headquarters in Washington that agricultural success in the Punjab, coming at the same time as continued rural decline in Bengal, would contribute significantly to the breakup of Pakistan, especially as average incomes in the Western wing had abruptly risen two-thirds higher than in Bengal.

The fall of Ayub Khan's government, after weeks of urban rioting by uprooted landless laborers and small farmers, first revealed that the modernization of agriculture in the Punjab had not only sharply increased food production but also the number of unemployed peasants. The negative effect of the new methods on the poorer rural classes was more severe on the Pakistani side of the frontier, where the land ownership ceiling was 250 acres; it was 30 acres in the Indian Punjab. Pakistani Government statistics claimed that only 15,000 farmers owned holdings larger than 150 acres, but did not emphasize that a great many of these properties were vast estates of 1,000 to 1,500 acres. One large landowner, who had 1,500 acres of irrigated wheat, told me last year that he had cleared a net profit of more than $100,000 on his last crop. While there had been some land reform under Ayub Khan, it clearly had not gone far enough.

By tradition, landless laborers in the old Punjab had received every twentieth bale of wheat harvested—enough to feed their families for a year. In India, where some adjustment had been made, they were getting in 1969 the twenty-fifth to thirtieth bale, which was an improvement. But in Pakistan they were still getting the same old absolute amount, but now by weight, instead of a percentage of the crop, and most landless laborers were being paid the same average yearly incomes of less than $100 that they had been getting for a decade.

In the 1970 election, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League campaigned on a straight regional autonomy issue and it was thought certain in Rawalpindi that they would sweep East Bengal. The election result which really shook the West Pakistanis was the overwhelming victory of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his Pakistan People's Party, which got twice the number of votes expected and virtually eliminated the conservative Islamic parties.

The middle classes feared that Bhutto, a political opportunist, had made too many promises to the poorest peasants, stirring them up and filling them with dangerously high aspirations. They did not fear Bhutto himself or his party since he and most of the other leaders are big landowners and the army has many close links with the landed families. I was in rural Pakistan at the time of the elections and the villages were ablaze with rumors of peasants rebelling against landlords and incidents of forcible land seizure. The mood was ugly and utterly unrelated to the possibility that the Eastern wing would seek autonomy, if not independence.

Within a day of the election, one of Bhutto's top aides issued a public statement denying rumors that Bhutto favored a 50-acre land ceiling. He said that it was official party policy to support a 150-acre ceiling. In a country of 60,000 villages, where only 15,000 really big landlords would be affected, Bhutto's land redistribution proposals were obviously inadequate. The experience in the Indian Punjab has established that a farmer with 25 acres who capably manages his resources, can do well with the new seeds and methods of cultivation.

Since he made his hero's return from New York and took over the Presidency of Pakistan last month, Bhutto has gone through the motions of declaring his faith in the eternal unity of the now-broken state. More to the point, he has promised land, labor and educational reforms* and an end to corruption and nepotism. Landowners and industrialists who refuse to cooperate have been threatened with various penalties; a few have been put under house arrest and there has been some nationalization. But with the economy down on its knees from the war, he is in no position to carry out most of the Socialist pledges he rashly made during the elections. Behind a plea for patience there has been a hint of fear that popular disillusionment may set in before his radical but badly needed policies can be implemented.

A land ceiling somewhere in the neighborhood of the Indian Punjab's 30 acres per family is essential if Bhutto's government is to survive, as are labor laws that would force landlords to share a larger part of the wheat harvest with their workers. Pakistan's rush into farm mechanization must be halted in order to stem the flood of dispossessed landless laborers and small farmers into the city slums. Otherwise new waves of urban rioting are inevitable.

In Bangladesh, the future depends as much on what the Americans and Russians do as upon the Indians. The war has left India bankrupt. The 1971 budget foresaw a deficit of about $300 million; by the time hostilities broke out, it had ballooned to more than $400 million. Now it is conservatively estimated that the war will add another $200 million, even if the United States, Japan and Belgium resume economic aid, as they probably will.

If India is to be helped to survive as an open society, the place to start is Bangladesh. If the Indians, with Russian support, can restore some semblance of political stability there, massive economic and technical assistance for agriculture ought to be provided by the United States.

*Literacy in the Indian Punjab is almost universal up through elementary school. Across the border it is just over 10 per cent, another example of how the landless Pakistani laborers have been repressed.

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One possibility would be to develop a new high-yield floating rice, and researchers are already at work. Another would be to get the annual floods of the Ganges and Brahmaputra under control, so that the already available varieties of high-yield dwarf rice could be widely planted. [See "Pakistan: What Never Gets Said," by Paul Deutschman, *The Nation*, November 8, 1971.]

A massive engineering project is needed, to include the construction of enormous embankments and irrigation systems, and with them an extension service to train Bengali peasants in modern methods of rice cultivation. In 1968, when the potentialities of the new dwarf rice were fully seen, there was talk in Dacca of constructing a countrywide flood-control system within seven to ten years. Nothing was done and to some degree East Bengal's jute exports continued to pay for West Pakistan's industrial development; two-thirds of the $600 million or so in foreign aid that Pakistan received each year also went to the Western wing.

In most poor Asian countries the great race has been to see whether industrial employment, with its promise of a decent life, can keep pace with the growth of urbanization, as more and more peasants are uprooted from the overpopulated villages. In Bangladesh, this race has never even been run, since the country's shifting waterways and the lack of any real infrastructure of road and rail communications are serious drawbacks to industrialization. The solution for the 77 million East Bengalis—assuming that those now in West Bengal come home again—must lie in agriculture. The Russians and Indians lack the technology. Although Mrs. Gandhi has talked much of "self-reliance" and the lack of need for substantial U.S. assistance, if there is any hope for Bangladesh—and indeed for India—the Americans must offer it. □

THE ARMAGEDDON BLUFF

Dr. Kissinger's Strategy for Winning Mr. Nixon's War

VIRGINIA BRODINE and MARK SELDEN

This article is part of a paper prepared by Virginia Brodine and Mark Selden for the Foreign Policy Roundtable, most of whose members are on the faculty of Washington University, St. Louis. It will be incorporated in a book—Open Secret: The Kissinger-Nixon Doctrine in Asia—*to be published by Harper & Row as an original paperback in April.*

Ms Brodine was until recently editor of Environment, *and is now consulting editor for that magazine; she is the author of a forthcoming book on pollution. Mr. Selden is assistant professor of history at Washington University, co-editor of the* Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars *and the author of* The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China *(Harvard University Press).*

Henry A. Kissinger's reputation as a strategist was founded on *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (1957) which attacked the Dulles strategy of deterrence based on massive nuclear retaliation. As Kissinger said in his preface:

> Mankind has at its disposal the means to destroy itself at the precise moment when schisms among nations have never been deeper. And the attempt to come to grips with the horrors of the new technology confronts the additional handicap that we can draw only limited guidance from previous experience because much of it has been made irrelevant by the very enormity of modern means of mass destruction.

But *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* addressed itself neither to closing the schisms among nations nor to avoiding the use of nuclear weapons. Nor did it take exception to the basic goals of the Dulles foreign policy. It proposed making maximum use of nuclear weapons in a strategy that closely integrated diplomacy and force, while seeking to stop short of all-out nuclear war. Kissinger felt that no enemy would actually believe that massive nuclear retaliation would be used by the United States unless this nation's very survival were in imminent danger. If that were the only situation in which the United States would actually use massive retaliation, that would be the only situation it could deter, Kissinger said. What he advocated was a more credible deterrent, one which the United States really *would* use where its interests, but not its survival, were at stake.

Kissinger's strategic doctrine called, thus, for the United States to maintain forces ranging all the way from small, mobile conventional armaments up to the capability for waging all-out nuclear war, and neglecting no level in between, so that graduated threats of force, or use of force, appropriate to any situation could be employed. Limited war—what Kissinger called intermediate applications of power—may, he wrote, "bring much higher political returns than resort to all-out war," and "offer the best chance to bring about strategic changes favorable to our side."

A single paragraph in *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* illuminates Kissinger's view of the failure of the Dulles strategy and the rationale for limited war, and simultaneously reveals that his strategy is only a different and perhaps even more dangerous kind of brinkmanship. This passage is also interesting because it indicates that in 1957, when the United States was not deeply involved in Indochina, Kissinger was apparently ready to "confront" the "risks" involved in seeking a military solution there.

> The key problem of present-day strategy is to devise a spectrum of capabilities with which to resist Soviet challenges. These capabilities should enable us to confront the opponent with contingencies from which he can extricate himself *only* by all-out war, while deterring him from this step by a superior retaliatory capacity. Since the most difficult decision for a statesman is whether to risk the national substance by unleashing an all-out war, the psychological advantage will always be

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on the side of the power which can shift to its opponent the decision to initiate all-out war. All Soviet moves in the postwar period have had this character. They have faced us with problems which by themselves did not seem worth an all-out war, but with which we could not deal by an alternative capability. We refused to defeat the Chinese in Korea because we were unwilling to risk an all-out conflict. We saw no military solution to the Indochinese crisis without accepting risks which we were reluctant to confront. We recoiled before the suggestion of intervening in Hungary lest it unleash a thermonuclear holocaust. A strategy of limited war might reverse or at least arrest this trend. Limited war is thus not an alternative to massive retaliation, but its complement. It is the capability for massive retaliation which provides the sanction against expanding the war.

The brinkmanship that insists on pressing a limited war to the point where the only choice before the enemy is defeat or unlimited war is revealed in another way by Kissinger's critique of U.S. strategy in the Korean War. He viewed our intervention there as a "major act of statesmanship," but severely criticized its conduct, because it was *too limited*. When reading his comments on the Korean War, it is well to remember that Kissinger is now in a position to apply the same conceptions of risk taking, and the same evaluation of worthy goals, to the war in Indochina, with immediate practical consequences for both Asian and American peoples.

He suggests that in Korea we should have "set ourselves more ambitious goals," although there would have been two risks in doing so: that the war would spread in Asia, but without becoming an all-out war; or that it would become an all-out war between the United States and the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, we should have taken the chance:

> Had we pushed back the Chinese armies even to the narrow neck of the Korean peninsula, we would have administered a setback to Communist power in its first trial at arms with the free world. This might have caused China to question the value of its Soviet alliance while the USSR would have been confronted with the dilemma of whether it was "worth" an all-out war to prevent a limited defeat of its ally.

To implement a strategy of limited war not only requires "a military capability which is truly graduated" but also "a diplomacy which can keep each conflict from being considered the prelude to a final showdown," although "we can make a strategy of limited war stick only if we leave no doubt about our readiness and our ability to face a final showdown."

Kissinger gives some attention to how a war is to be kept limited. One kind of limited war which comes in for a great deal of discussion in his first book is that among major powers when there is a *tacit agreement* not to escalate. He even goes so far as to say that ". . . in a period of the most advanced technology, battles will approach the stylized contests of the feudal period which served as much as a test of will as a trial of strength." While later books do not repeat such fantasies, in 1965 he was still advocating *early use of tactical nuclear weapons* in NATO European strategy, in the hope that a standstill in military operations could be forced and a war in that theatre could remain limited:

Books and Articles by Henry A. Kissinger Cited in this Article

1957 *A World Restored.* Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London.

1957 *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy.* Harper & Brothers, New York.

1960 *The Necessity for Choice.* Harper & Brothers, New York.

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1965 *The Troubled Partnership, A Re-Appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance.* McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York.

1968 "The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck." *Daedalus*, Summer, 1968.

1969 *American Foreign Policy, Three Essays.* W. W. Norton & Co., New York.

> There may be no *logical* stopping place once nuclear weapons are used. There is, however, a very crucial *psychological* obstacle to automatic escalation. When mutual invulnerability guarantees catastrophic destruction and offers no prospect of great military advantage, neither side can be very eager to let escalation proceed automatically. Both sides are likely to look for excuses to limit, not expand, military operations.

A war in which both sides are "looking for excuses to limit military operations" is a strange war, indeed. In fact, the more one pursues the implications of the Kissinger limited war strategy, the more it becomes clear that it is not applicable to rather evenly matched enemies, but to a different situation: war which he describes as inherently limited because of disparity in power. In recent years, Kissinger has recognized that direct aggression by the USSR against Western Europe or the United States is improbable, and that intermediate applications of U.S. power are likely to be used against smaller or less industrially developed nations.

There was so much talk in *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* about the opportunities presented by a limited war, that Kissinger's strategy seemed to include initiating such a war. This impression was strengthened when he raised the question of whether our strategic interest was limited only to opposing the forcible expansion of communism, or whether "the existence of a Communist regime in some areas" is "a threat to our security, however the regime is established. Do we resist Communist domination of an area only when it is 'illegal' or because the domination of Eurasia by communism would upset the strategic balance against us?"

In his next book, *The Necessity for Choice,* Kissinger hastens to say that "No responsible person advocates *initiating* limited war. The problem of limited war will arise only in case of Communist aggression or blackmail." His definition of aggression or blackmail is, however, extremely broad. At various times in his books, he includes in this category the events leading to our intervention in Korea and in Vietnam, the Soviet missiles in Cuba, China's

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action in Tibet and its border dispute with India, the Soviet supplying of arms to Egypt, the Soviet moves in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the pressure on Berlin, Communist influence in the Congo, and various other unspecified interventions by the USSR and China in Third World countries.

The threat, *or use*, of force—for Kissinger does not believe the United States should make threats it is not willing to carry through—may therefore be initiated in response to a wide spectrum of actions by other nations, even the legal election of a government unacceptable to Washington. In spite of a somewhat less belligerent tone, his most recent book still advocates placing this country's alleged national interest above another country's legal right to choose its own government. "We find it hard to articulate a truly vital interest which we would defend however 'legal' the challenge," he complains. We may find it difficult to articulate such a policy, as Kissinger says. But the U.S. has not hesitated to *act* on such a policy. The Pentagon study of the Vietnamese War makes it clear that the U.S. Government assumed it had a vital interest in forestalling the possible unification of the country under a Communist, pro-Communist, or neutralist government—an interest which overrode the legal requirement of the Geneva Conference to hold unification elections. Similar action in another country would be perfectly consistent with the Kissinger strategy.

The growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and the increased significance of long-range missiles forced Kissinger to reappraise his 1957 argument that limited nuclear war would be to the advantage of the United States and the disadvantage of Russia. China, however, does not have such a stockpile, and that brings us to the heart of the contemporary crisis. All of Kissinger's original arguments for limited nuclear war against the Soviet Union now apply to China. Although China has conducted several successful nuclear tests and has recently launched satellites, U.S. nuclear superiority over China is probably far greater than it was over the Soviet Union in 1957. Furthermore, although Kissinger recognized the political disadvantage of using nuclear weapons against a nonnuclear power, he never completely ruled them out:

> In a police action against a nonnuclear minor power, in a civil war in which the population must be won over, the use of nuclear weapons *may* be unnecessary or unwise for either political or psychological reasons. . . . The problem of limited nuclear war arises *primarily* in actions against nuclear powers *or against powers with vast resources of manpower* which are difficult to overcome with conventional technology. (Emphasis added.)

He has always seen the superior industrial and nuclear technology of the United States as a source of strength which compensates for the larger conventional forces of an opponent. That is one of his justifications for giving an important role to tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. For a nation like the United States, he says, the "strategically most productive form of war is to utilize weapons of an intermediate range of destructiveness," meaning some of the smaller nuclear weapons, because these are "sufficiently destructive so that manpower cannot be substituted for technology" by the other side. In the same passage, he points out that the destructiveness of the individual weapons was "too small" in Korea, and therefore Communist China was able to substitute manpower for technology.

The opening of a diplomatic channel to China (culminating in resumption of formal relations) fits in perfectly with the Kissinger view of international relations and with a determined effort to take advantage of the "difficult challenges and new opportunities" that have arisen from the Sino-Soviet split. In his words, force without diplomacy is "immoderate in triumph and panicky in adversity." As long as U.S. leaders were unable to talk to Chinese leaders, the U.S. was limited to force without diplomacy. Whether or not Kissinger would consider that the United States had at any time since World War II been immoderate in triumph in Asia, the situation in Indochina was beginning to present the danger that we might become panicky in adversity. But the other half of his formula is that "diplomacy which is not related to a plausible employment of force is sterile."

As a new stage in Sino-U.S. relations begins, every effort will be made to advance U.S. national interests (as the Nixon Administration sees them) through diplomatic means. Should the dialogue with China prove abortive, however, the threat of force which Kissinger sees as inseparable from diplomacy may come into play. Kissinger once wanted to confront the Soviet Union with the dilemma of whether it was worth an all-out war to prevent a limited defeat of its then ally, China. The parallel in the 1970s would be to confront China with the dilemma of whether it is worth all-out war to prevent a limited defeat of its ally, North Vietnam.

The Kissinger-Nixon doctrine, as expressed in the 1971 "State of the World" message, emphasizes a limited war strategy, with an important role for nuclear weapons:

> To deter conventional aggression, we and our allies together must be capable of posing unacceptable risks to potential enemies. We must not be in a position of being able to employ only strategic weapons to meet challenges to our interests. *On the other hand, having a full range of options does not mean that we will necessarily limit our response to the level or intensity chosen by an enemy.* Potential enemies must know that we will respond to whatever degree is required to protect our interests. They must also know that they will only worsen their situation by escalating the level of violence. (Emphasis added.)

In regard to Europe:

> Sole reliance on conventional forces might lead an aggressor to conclude that we might accept the loss of vital territory without taking further action. Sole reliance on nuclear forces, on the other hand, might lead inevitably and unnecessarily to the very widespread devastation that we should be trying to prevent. Neither of these prospects enhances our security.

The doctrine makes it clear that the United States can itself no longer substitute manpower for nuclear technology, and by Kissinger's logic that increases the likelihood of resort to small nuclear weapons of an "intermediate range of destructiveness."

Earl Ravenal, former director of the Asian Division (Systems Analysis) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, writing in *Foreign Affairs* (January 1971) drew similar conclusions:

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Essentially we are to support the same level of potential involvement with smaller conventional forces. The specter of intervention will remain, but the risk of defeat or stalemate will be greater; or the nuclear threshold will be lower.

An article on nuclear policy written about the same time by Robert Lawrence of the University of Arizona, former Defense Department consultant, discussed the opportunity rather than the danger presented by nuclear weapons, much in the Kissinger manner. It was published in the French *Revue Militaire Générale* but received widespread notice in this country because someone called it to the attention of C. L. Sulzberger of *The New York Times*. Sulzberger, basing his column of November 15, 1970 on Lawrence's article, wrote:

> The greatest lesson of the Vietnam war is that America still has many commitments abroad and still retains foreign policy aims that can no longer be maintained by the kind of military establishment, strategy or network of alliances now employed. . . .
>
> Limited commitments to conventional defense are seen as increasingly outmoded, yet total warfare is a dreadful absurdity. . . .
>
> Consequently, the search focuses on a third solution. The answer may well lie in the field of truly tactical atomic weapons.

The suggestion is for the research and development of "purely fission warheads measured in tons" (rather than kilotons) and "neutron warheads."

Of course there is the old problem of public revulsion against the use of nuclear weapons that has bothered Kissinger since the fifties, when he said that we required a "diplomacy which seeks to break down the atmosphere of special horror which now surrounds the use of nuclear weapons. . . ." Kissinger objected to having the nuclear arm of the U.S. military tied behind its back by moral scruples. Addressing this same question, Sulzberger found an appropriate quotation from Bismarck:

> We live in a wondrous time in which the strong is weak because of his moral scruples and the weak grows strong because of his audacity.

(Sulzberger does not give a source for the quotation. It can be found in *Die Politischen Reden des Fürsten Bismarck, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe*. In can also be found in "The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck" by Henry A. Kissinger.)

The Kissinger-Nixon doctrine applies not only to Europe and to future situations that may arise in Asia. It applies very specifically to the limited war in which the United States is now involved. Here, too, Kissinger was prepared, before coming to the White House, with a plan for fighting a limited war that was part and parcel of his larger strategy.

The purpose of limited war, he says, "is to inflict losses or to pose risks for the enemy out of proportion to the objectives under dispute." He explains that it should be fought by applying "graduated amounts of destruction," interrupted by "breathing spaces for political contacts."

That is the heart of Kissinger's military strategy. While the destruction inflicted or threatened should be out of proportion to what the enemy will gain by continuing the war, diplomacy during the breathing spaces should offer a settlement sufficiently attractive to persuade him to end the fighting.

Szep, Boston Globe

> Paradoxical as it may seem in the jet age, strategic doctrine should address itself to the problem of slowing down, if not the pace of military operations, at least the rapidity with which they succeed each other. Strategic doctrine must never lose sight of the fact that its purpose is to affect the will of the enemy, *not to destroy him*, and that war can be limited only by presenting the enemy with an unfavorable calculus of risks.

If, after one breathing space, the enemy does not evaluate "the calculus of risks" as unfavorable, the next round will hit him harder. The second round of diplomacy will then offer another settlement. Kissinger always insists upon meeting *or exceeding* the enemy's force levels. If conventional forces are matched by the enemy, only nuclear force remains.

When the Nixon Administration took office, Kissinger was in a position to apply his strategy of alternate "breathing spaces for diplomacy" and "graduated amounts of destruction" to impose U.S. terms.

Diplomacy #1. After months of haggling over the location of the peace talks and who should participate, the stage was set for substantive discussions when Nixon took office. Kissinger had played a role during the Johnson administration in establishing contacts with the North Vietnamese, and there seems little doubt that he and Nixon were eager to employ the Paris talks and other diplomatic channels to end the war. It was not clear to the public, however, what their terms for ending the war were, and what would happen if those terms were not accepted.

The peace offer made in Paris by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge five days after Nixon took office demanded *mutual* withdrawal of U.S. military forces and of North Vietnamese "military and subversive" forces from South Vietnam, and "the right of the South Vietnamese people to determine their own future." It is now abundantly clear

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that the latter phrase means keeping U.S. forces in Vietnam until the South Vietnamese Government is strong enough to maintain itself in power. In spite of minor modifications, these two points have remained the basis of all subsequent U.S. peace offers.

Neither Kissinger nor Nixon was likely to make what Kissinger had called the "mistake" in Korea of stopping the fighting when starting the talking. Throughout the first months of the Administration, the war raged on. General Abrams' orders were to keep up maximum pressure. However, there were certain restraints on the force that could be applied. Johnson had stopped the bombing of North Vietnam as part of the unwritten understanding that had made possible the opening of the Paris talks. Domestic opposition to the war had increased to the point where a long war with a larger American ground force was, as Kissinger recognized, politically unacceptable. The South Vietnamese Army, despite U.S. efforts to strengthen it, was obviously unable to carry on alone—as the invasion of Laos would subsequently demonstrate. Other countries allied with the United States had only token forces in South Vietnam, and pleas for greater assistance, for example by Clark Clifford during the Johnson administration, had met with little success. If any U.S. troops were to be pulled out short of a peace agreement, some change in the other available forces would be necessary to prosecute the war. The Administration announced a determined effort to make Vietnamization a reality.

All during 1969 the Nixon Administration attempted, in public and private talks, to get the other side to accept its terms. In the spring of that year the NLF offered a ten-point peace proposal which rejected the proposition that other Vietnamese were "foreign" or "external" forces in the same category as U.S. forces. It demanded complete withdrawal by the United States and the forming of a provisional government "representing the various social strata and political tendencies," instead of leaving the present South Vietnamese Government in control until elections could be held.

The peace talks were deadlocked, but within a month after the first order for the withdrawal of U.S. ground troops (June 8) a drop in the level of combat was noted, suggesting that action toward withdrawal would be met with de-escalation by the other side. On October 12, Secretary of State Rogers officially acknowledged that the President had changed the directive for combat in Vietnam from "maximum pressure" to "protective reaction." The level of ground combat continued to be lower throughout 1969.

Although summer had brought a reduction in the ground fighting, it had also brought the enunciation of the Doctrine for Asia, which showed the extent of the Administration's commitment to victory in Vietnam and the extent of its commitment to Saigon. This made it unlikely that there would be any major change in the U.S. peace terms. The Doctrine for Asia, first stated by Nixon on Guam, July 26, 1969, threatened future Vietnams, based on a combination of Asian foot soldiers and U.S. air power. But first the war in Indochina had to be won, or the U.S. position as an Asian power might be undermined. Although the doctrine expresses caution about engaging U.S. ground forces against guerrillas, American economic and military assistance, air and naval power and, if necessary, nuclear weapons, will be used to protect such governments as the military dictatorship of Thailand, or the Chiang Kai-shek regime on Taiwan. As Nixon put it in an address to the nation on May 14, 1969: ". . . we have to demonstrate—*at the point at which confrontation is being tested*—that confrontation with the United States is costly and unrewarding." (Emphasis added.)

Force #1. As the Administration's first year approached an end, the diplomatic stalemate was publicly underlined. Ambassador Lodge and his second in command resigned from the U.S. team in Paris, leaving the No. 3 man, Philip Habib, as "acting head." Nixon indicated that he had no intention of naming a replacement for Lodge until he received "a serious proposal" from the other side.

In addresses in November and December 1969, Nixon deplored the diplomatic stalemate and threatened new military moves. He stressed this warning in a news conference at the end of January:

> If at a time that we are attempting to de-escalate the fighting in Vietnam, we find that they take advantage of our troop withdrawals to jeopardize the remainder of our forces by escalating the fighting, then we have the means —and I will be prepared to use those means strongly— to deal with that situation more strongly than we have dealt with it in the past.

According to Kissinger's guide to fighting a limited war, it was now time to turn the screw of destruction. What means were available? Four moves had been advocated by various military and political figures (including Nixon) since the American buildup began in 1965: unrestricted bombing of the North, attacking and destroying Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos, mining Haiphong harbor and invading North Vietnam.

The ouster of Cambodian Prince Sihanouk in March 1970 provided the United States with a major opportunity to put one of these proposals into action. On April 20, Nixon made a major public speech in which he claimed that almost 40,000 Communist troops were committing "overt aggression" against Cambodia, while at the Paris talks, the U.S. spokesman was telling the NLF and DRV that their side's military activity was "not compatible with serious negotiations."

On April 30, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia. A massive air attack on North Vietnam accompanied the invasion. U.S. troops remained in Cambodia two months, leaving a widened war behind when they withdrew. This was in keeping with the Kissinger limited war strategy, a strategy that Nixon explained when he was asked how his escalation differed from that of Johnson: ". . . the difference is that he did move step by step. This action is a decisive move; and this action also puts the enemy on warning that if it escalates while we are trying to de-escalate, we will move decisively and not step by step."

Diplomacy #2. Immediately after the withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from Cambodia at the end of June, the opening of the second diplomatic phase was signaled by the appointment of David K. Bruce to head the

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Paris talks, and by a statement from Nixon as to what he expected from this round of diplomacy:

> You will generally find that negotiations occur, negotiations which end war, only when the balance of power changes significantly, only when one party or the other concludes that as a result of the shift in the military balance they no longer have an opportunity to accomplish their goal militarily and therefore they had best negotiate. . . . Cambodia . . . has changed the military balance.

Yet Nixon's "decisive move," like so many earlier escalations of force, failed to achieve its objective. Early in October, Nixon made a new peace offer, but without a substantial change in the previous U.S. position. Again, the other side failed to respond in the way that Nixon thought it should. The diplomatic deadlock continued.

Domestic reaction to the Cambodian adventure had made it clear that the use of U.S. ground troops in further escalations would be extremely unwise politically. However, the Administration had been removing restraints on the use of air power, and resumption of heavy bombing in the North (as in Johnson's day, or heavier) was now a possible option for the next graduation of force. Throughout this period, bombing of *Laos* intensified, and by June 1970 was reported to have reached 20,000 to 25,000 sorties a month. Apparently, the bombing of North Vietnam had never altogether stopped. In January 1969, the other side had complained in Paris that the United States was bombing the North. Ambassador Lodge admitted only to action "to defend our reconnaissance planes and pilots when they have been fired upon."

Secretary Rogers was still using the same argument that we were defending planes and pilots when air attacks on North Vietnam by more than 100 planes took place simultaneously with the invasion of Cambodia. Two months later, however, when asked about the possibility of a resumption of heavy bombing of North Vietnam, he replied, "I don't think it's appropriate for us to foreclose options."

On November 2, 1970, U.S. planes bombed North Vietnam for twenty-eight hours. At the same time, the United States conducted a futile raid on the Son Tay prisoner-of-war camp. The raid probably played a double role in American strategic design. It served as a warning to the North Vietnamese that their territory was subject to invasion, a message which would shortly be conveyed more explicitly. It was also the most dramatic step in the Administration's manipulation of the prisoner-of-war issue to build domestic support.

In the very first plenary session of the peace talks in Paris, Ambassador Lodge had said that "we seek the early release of prisoners of war." In the months that followed, the Administration made much of this issue, trying to separate it from other issues being negotiated. However, the Administration has made it clear that concern for the fate of the POWs will not be allowed to interfere with bombing the North, or any other requirement of U.S. strategy or tactics. As Frank Borman, Special Representative of the President on Prisoners of War said on September 22, 1970: ". . . it is quite obvious to any student of the intercourse of nations that our course in Southeast Asia cannot be influenced in any significant manner by the treatment or the cause of the prisoners."

Pierotti

"Yes, This Is the President."

Force #2. Action in Laos intensified in late 1970 and early 1971. In mid-December, the Pathet Lao reported stepped-up fighting in the Plain of Jars. North Vietnam charged that more Thai troops were being sent to the Bolovens Plateau and to Long Cheng. B-52 raids along the Laos-North Vietnam border intensified. On February 5 Bruce said at Paris that the United States would carry out "alternative solutions to the conflict" unless serious peace negotiations were begun.

Finally, Laos was invaded on February 8 by South Vietnamese forces with heavy U.S. air and logistical support. Again, as in Cambodia, the invasion was presented as limited in time and purpose. South Vietnamese forces withdrew by March 12, but U.S. bombing, which had begun before the invasion, continued afterward. The Laos invasion has generally been judged a failure. Certainly, it was not a military success for the South Vietnamese forces, which retreated in disarray with heavy losses, nor did it bring the other side to accept U.S. terms for peace. However, it did increase the extent of the already great destruction in Laos, and in the framework of the Kissinger strategy that may well have been one of its major purposes.

Diplomacy #3. In his elucidation of limited war, Kissinger had emphasized the importance of developing "a concept of military operations conducted in phases which permit an assessment of the risks and possibilities for settlement at each stage, before recourse is had to the next phase of operations."

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It would be reassuring to think that the Administration's failure to evaluate properly the strength and determination of the Vietnamese, and its failure to bring the war to a close on its own terms, is being reassessed during the present phase. Thus far, there are no signs of major changes in the U.S. negotiating position, despite strong sentiment in the Senate and the country for setting a date for total withdrawal, and a major peace offer from the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (the National Liberation Front) proposing simultaneous repatriation of U.S. prisoners of war and withdrawal of U.S. military forces.

The U.S. response to this offer—which had effectively cut the ground out from under the Administration's manipulation of the POW issue—was not to reject it outright but to bury the issue under a dazzling series of diplomatic moves that replaced public preoccupation with the war with larger hopes for peace in Asia.

Kissinger's China trip inaugurated a bold new phase in the diplomacy of the cold war, but months earlier there had been indications of this new phase in Sino-American relations. "At the time of the Laos invasion," Marquis Childs wrote in the June 1 *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, "Henry A. Kissinger . . . stated without qualification his conviction that China would not send troops in to support the North Vietnamese. He based this, prior to the invitation to the American ping-pong team, on progress made through channels in establishing a new relationship with . . . China." U.S. negotiations with China may be directed not only to insuring against Chinese intervention in Indochina in the event of another major escalation there, but to inducing Peking to put pressure on its Indochinese allies to accept peace terms acceptable to the United States.

Nixon's overtures to China reflect an awareness at the highest levels of the Administration of changing patterns of world power. China, Japan and the Soviet Union all enjoy increasing strength in Asia, while the United States has been drained economically and divided politically by the Indochinese war. Nixon's Kansas City speech of July 6, 1971, provides the clearest expression to date of his view of the new power balance in Asia. He noted the rise of Western Europe, Japan, the USSR and the People's Republic of China as major global centers of power, *while the United States remained preoccupied with Vietnam*. A month later, the Administration's dramatic attempt to shore up the sagging dollar and stimulate a stagnant economy with the most extreme economic and financial measures since the great depression provided eloquent testimony to the corrosion of U.S. economic power.

Economic and political troubles at home do not mean that Nixon has softened U.S. terms for victory in Indochina. Indeed, quite the reverse is possible. If he fails to achieve victory via negotiations with China, he may order a dangerous escalation of the Indochinese war, including direct conflict with China. Behind the proffered hand of negotiation lies a nuclear fist.

The first diplomatic phase in 1969 created illusions at home that the war would soon end. The Cambodian invasion dealt those illusions a hard blow, yet during the second breathing space new illusions were fostered, only to be submerged by the Laos invasion. During the third diplomatic phase, the approach to China has again stimulated illusions that the end of the war is only a matter of time, in spite of the continued presence of U.S. troops and continued U.S. bombing. Illusions die hard.

Force #3. What further escalations are possible? A third blow would have to be more decisive than the Laotian fiasco. One possibility is a South Vietnamese invasion of North Vietnam with U.S. support. Since this had been hinted by Saigon leaders, Nixon was asked about it in his news conference of February 17, while the Laotian invasion was still in progress. The President refused to "speculate on what South Vietnam may decide to do with regard to a possible incursion into North Vietnam," but he did not rule out American air support for such a venture. He said:

> I am not going to place any limitation upon the use of air power except, of course, to rule out a rather ridiculous suggestion that is made from time to time . . . that our air power might include the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

The President did list, however, some limitations on ground forces:

> For example, we are not going to use ground forces in Laos. We are not going to use advisers in Laos with the South Vietnamese forces. We are not going to use ground forces in Cambodia or advisers in Cambodia . . . and we have no intention, of course, of using ground forces in North Vietnam. Those are limitations.

It should be noted that the Son Tay raid on North Vietnam did not constitute what the Administration means by "ground forces." Therefore, the President's limitations do not rule out raids on North Vietnam by airborne or naval forces.

Such raids, unless on a big scale and accompanied by heavy bombing, would be more symbolic than decisive. South Vietnamese forces numbering over 1 million, but with an effective fighting force of roughly 100,000, are already spread thin. Nevertheless, "incursions" of one kind or another into North Vietnam are one possibility for a new display of force.

Another option is saturation bombing of North Vietnam, and observers have suggested this as the most likely move. Morton H. Halperin, who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Johnson administration and on the National Security Council Senior Staff under Kissinger, until he resigned in September 1969, said in *The New York Times* of November 7, 1970:

> President Nixon's Vietnamization policy, far from getting us out of Vietnam, will at best lead to an indefinite presence in Vietnam of thousands of American troops. It could well drive the President to massive escation, the mining of Haiphong Harbor and saturation bombing of North Vietnam.

Johnson bombed the North without success, but Daniel Ellsberg interprets Nixon's view as being that the Democrats moved too gradually and too predictably, and never threatened, or used, *heavy enough* bombing. He suggests that Nixon's next "decisive" move may be

> . . . "decisive" bombing of targets long proposed by some U.S. military chiefs and their political spokesmen: Haiphong, "military targets" in Hanoi and unrestrictedly

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throughout the North, the dikes, the communications with China.

One of the most vocal advocates of this course in the past was Nixon himself.

The third available "conventional war" option is the mining of Haiphong harbor. The risk in that move is that the ships of other nations, particularly the Soviet Union, may be destroyed. According to Clark Clifford, Johnson's Secretary of Defense, this danger restrained the Johnson administration from that step.

None of these few remaining conventional options holds the prospect of decisively shifting the war in favor of the United States, yet all of them pose heavy risks. Heavy bombing of the North, especially north of the 19th parallel close to the Chinese border, carries the risk of bringing Chinese forces into the war, as happened in Korea, or some other response from China. Ground invasion of North Vietnam, of course, greatly increases this risk.

The entrance of China was also risked with the invasion of Cambodia, but it was officially explained that the danger was "considered sufficiently remote so that looking at the situation on balance it was concluded that this was an acceptable risk." The risk was greater with the invasion of Laos, which borders on China. The seriousness with which China regarded that adventure was shown by the visit to Hanoi of a Chinese delegation headed by Premier Chou En-lai in March, while the operation was still in progress. The joint communiqué, issued by the Chinese and North Vietnamese also stressed the war in the air:

> U.S. imperialism has now dispatched tens of thousands of U.S. troops and Saigon puppet troops to carry out a massive invasion of Laos in collusion with the Laotian rightist forces and Thai mercenaries. . . . What is more, the Nixon government has blatantly declared that it will not place any limitation upon the use of U.S. air power anywhere in Indochina.
>
> * * *
>
> Should U.S. imperialism go down the road of expanding its war of aggression in Indochina, the Chinese people are determined to take all necessary measures, not flinching even from the greatest national sacrifices, to give all-out support and assistance to the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples for the thorough defeat of the U.S. aggressors.

Signals of peaceful intent have gone out to China prior to each of Nixon's escalations, but there have also been threats. Administration descriptions of the doctrine emphasize that any action by China against a U.S. ally in Southeast Asia may bring our full military might into the conflict. The doctrine states that if China enters the war all limitations on the use of U.S. ground troops and on the use of nuclear weapons are off.

As in his 1970 "State of the World" message, Nixon said again in the 1971 message: ". . . the nuclear capability of our strategic and theatre nuclear forces serves as a deterrent to full-scale Soviet attack on NATO Europe or Chinese attack on our Asian allies." And as Kissinger has said so often in the past, a deterrent which one is afraid to implement ceases to be a deterrent.

The article on nuclear weapons by Lawrence referred to earlier included a specific reference to China, and was quoted by Sulzberger as follows:

> In the aftermath of Vietnam, we certainly do not propose to fight a large-scale conventional war with China. Yet the ability to engage Chinese military forces successfully may be a *sine qua non* of deterrence and stability in Asia.



Abu—Indian Express, New Delhi

The implication is that "theatre" nuclear weapons would be the way to engage Chinese forces successfully. Of course, neither Kissinger nor Nixon wants the threat of nuclear war to develop into an actuality. However, both the logic of the Kissinger strategy and the policies of the Administration to date suggest conventional escalations that finally brings us to the very brink of nuclear war.

Perhaps cooler heads in the Administration will prevail in a crisis, but one of the prime purposes of Kissinger's National Security Council system is to prevent a veto on bold action. His criticism of former policy making has been that it stressed "avoidance of risk rather than boldness of conception."

Kissinger's entire system minimizes the opportunity for those who would avoid risk to affect final outcome of a decision. All national security affairs filter through Kissinger, and he presents Nixon with the alternatives and their various opportunities and risks. By then, all the steps leading to a crisis may have been taken, and the only alternative may appear to be backing down or using nuclear weapons. When wise and humane counsel is needed, we may anticipate instead a confrontation called for by those "strong nerves" characteristic of the Kissinger ideal of statesmanship, that willingness to "face up to the risks of Armageddon," in the hope that the enemy will back down.

Fortunately, we are still at a point where even the Kissinger-Nixon doctrine calls for diplomatic moves. This is a crucial period for the American people. A large majority is united around the proposition that a definite date should be set for all U.S. forces to be out of Indochina.

A great deal of speculation centers on what Kissinger and Nixon will be up to in China, but whatever the specific moves, they will grow out of the basic world view and strategic conceptions these men evolved separately in the 1950s and 1960s and together since 1968.

As long as the war continues, great dangers confront

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both Asians and Americans. A reading of Kissinger's past work suggests that his influence may be in the direction of seeking to advance the "legitimate interests" of the United States in Asia by relying on "the bargaining power inherent in our industrial potential and our nuclear superiority." The 1971 "State of the World" message gives a very broad definition of U.S. interests in Indochina, Taiwan, Indonesia, Korea and Japan. The stakes will be higher in Peking than in Paris, for not only the future of Vietnam but U.S. interests throughout Asia and the balance of power in the world will be explicitly or implicitly on the bargaining table.

Nixon and Kissinger may be prepared to make China an attractive offer as part of the bargain they hope to strike. But in the Kissinger lexicon, diplomacy never appears unless force is close behind. Higher stakes also mean that a threat of greater force is appropriate, should talks break down, or China interfere with "legitimate" U.S. interests.

Nevertheless, there are exciting opportunities for peace in Asia, opportunities which have not been present for many years. The Nixon Administration has made a new move, but it cannot wholly control what follows. The American people, aware of the dangers and determined to take advantage of the opportunities, can contribute to the realization of a genuine peace in Asia. The people have already made it clear that they believe America's true interests in Asia begin with peace in Vietnam, meaning the withdrawal of *all* U.S. forces and weapons. This is also a necessary step toward normal relations with China and a reduction of tensions in the Far East. Peace in Vietnam is therefore more than ever the first item on the foreign policy agenda, as well as the first step toward returning to the American people a voice in their own destiny. □

'REFRIGERATOR ROULETTE'

The Sugar-Coated Children's Hour

ROBERT B. CHOATE

Mr. Choate, president of a Washington-based consulting firm, has won national attention in the past five years as chairman of the Council on Children, Media and Merchandising. He has testified frequently before Congressional committees, most notably in the summer of 1970, when he gave evidence to the Senate Subcommittee on the Consumer concerning the nutrient quality of dry cereals and the advertising practices of the industry that produces them.

"The way to a man's heart trouble is through his stomach," reads an advertising poster in the nation's capital. The picture on the poster shows a platter of French fries, ice cream, cupcakes, pizza, spaghetti and fatty gravy. At the same time, District of Columbia children watching television on weekends are advised ten times per hour to eat French fries and ice cream (courtesy of McDonald's), pastry (courtesy of General Foods), cupcakes (courtesy of Continental Baking), spaghetti (by Chef Boyardee) and pizza (from Shakey's and Geno's).

The heart trouble warning is all too real, but probably too late. The United States now stands eleventh among the nations of the world in adult life expectancy, and may be dropping still lower. "You are what you eat" goes the slogan, and today many Americans are fat, sagging and tired. Roughly 25 per cent of the population can be considered overweight. Even children in the elementary school playgrounds show signs of obesity. Food habits implanted from the age of 3 have visible effects by the time the child is 13 and may be earnestly regretted when he is 40.

A look at television commercials aimed at children reveals more than an advocacy of inferior foods. Twenty advertisements per hour interrupt children's programs; on prime-time adult programs, one seldom finds more than ten or twelve ads per hour. Half of the children's twenty ads sell edible products; nine out of ten of the edibles are promoted on the basis of their sugared, sweetened or "crisped" (read fried) qualities. With no accompanying warnings, a child is invited ten times per hour to establish food habits which his dentist or doctor will later deplore. (Interspersed with these ads are pitches for vitamin pills —sold to children "in case you don't eat right.") Ten times per hour adds up to 5,000 advertisements for edibles per year, even for a moderate TV-watching child. It's a course in gluttony.

The two charts show the types of product that are advertised on children's network television programs. Lacking the variety of adult commercials, more than 50 per cent of children's ads are for foods and beverages and almost 30 per cent sell toys. Ninety-two ads for cereals and fifty-two ads for candy, cookies and soft drinks made up a substantial part of the edibles advertised during twenty-eight hours of children's broadcasting in the week that ended April 11, 1971.

A list of the food products advertised between 10 A.M. and noon on the morning of Sunday, October 3, 1971, demonstrates the menu offered by television:

- Dairy Queen
- Charm Bubble Gum
- General Mills Cocoa Puffs
- General Mills Count Chocula (primary ingredient: sugar)
- General Mills Frankenberry (primary ingredient: sugar)
- Tootsie Pops
- Burger King
- Post Super Sugar Crisps (primary ingredient; sugar)
- Nabisco Chips Ahoy
- Nabisco Fig Newtons
- Cracker Jacks
- Kool Aid
- Hershey Bars and Chocolate Mix
- Continental Baking
- Quaker Cereals

This menu has been termed "refrigerator roulette."

Historically speaking, World War II was a major turning point in food habits within the United States. During that war, the country had a need for new semi-prepared foods to feed the armies and navies around the world. K and C rations emerged. While ex-GIs may wince

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

at the development, after the war this same technology inspired foods "to save the busy mother's time" and "to help you on those drudgy, draggy mornings." That the new foods saved time was soon obvious: that they nourished little and cost much was less immediately clear.

The quick-sprung medium of television conveniently carried the postwar message of the new food technology to all economic levels of the country. Today half of the food consumed in the United States—at home, at the office, in restaurants—is at least partially prepared on other premises. Much of it is unlabeled as to true ingredients; hardly any of it carries nutritional information.

The food industry became convinced long ago that nutrition couldn't sell its products. The advertising agencies turned to toys, fantasy, sex appeal and hilarity to distract the food purchaser from worrying about ingredients.

Television's tidal wave of nutrition miseducation would affect the rich and poor alike, but for the protection afforded the rich by their habits of overconsumption. Obesity from too many calories and arteriosclerosis from too many fats have become the symptoms of middle-class malnutrition. The poverty family, whose diet must be less varied, faces these problems, plus shortages of iron, calcium and vitamin A.

Unfortunately, the consumption of non-nutritious foods is no superficial matter, because the body is able to consume only a certain number of calories per day before it becomes "stuffed." Some scientists refer to an "appestat," which turns off the appetite after the consumption of a certain number of calories. If those calories have not also provided the critically needed protein, vitamin and mineral compounds, a physiological reaction sets in which, over an extended period, can adversely affect the health. Displacement of nutritious foods by non-nutritious pseudo foods poses real problems.

There has been a notable decline of activity among American adults since the 1930s. Workers and farmers of that period could consume 4,000 or more calories and burn it up in a day's work. Automation, mechanical assistance and a generally changed workload now decrease calorie needs. Today's appliance salesman, for instance, can stay healthy on 2,200 calories. The trouble is, the appliance salesman of 1972 has been raised on a diet of television and magazine advertisements; he salivates at the sight of a foaming beer, a Sara Lee cupcake or a Welsh rarebit. Overconsuming calories, he trusts in the manufacturer to keep him healthy. But until early 1970, it was a rare food manufacturer who watched his nutrient values.

The dry breakfast cereals are a case in point. Believed to be nutritious since their introduction at the turn of the last century, cereals have always been a somewhat fraudulent food supply. Their health claims have regularly surpassed their food values, despite supposed competition between manufacturers. Huge sums were expended to promote these cereals in the 1960s; sales leveled off toward the end of the decade despite determined efforts by the six major food companies. (FDA avoided the development of a standard for cereals "lest they be given respectability as a food," according to one old FDA-er.)

In July of 1970, the nutrient content of cereals and advertising practices of their producers were vigorously debated before a Senate Commerce subcommittee. Cereal company nutritionists and other company-financed experts defended the products against criticism and indeed bragged of their worth. Students of nutrition find their testimony reflects more Madison Avenue opinion than professional knowledge. A mere sixteen months later, two-thirds of the cereals heavily criticized in 1970 have been drastically reformulated for the American market. (A recent Georgia University study shows that the cereal *boxes*, if taken with milk and raisins, are as nutritious as all but the most sophisticated cereals—such as Life and Fortified Oat Flakes and Special K.)

Close examination of cereal manufacturing economics reveals no dearth of research surrounding these products. Research dollars do go into motivation experiments designed to find out how to sell to children. Research dollars do go into box design, plastic toy insertions and secret research on how to overcome the tooth decay encouraged by these sugar-laden carbohydrates.

Food habits of past civilizations evolved at a sluggish rate, though war, natural disasters and pestilence did occasionally force food changes. But television today has produced an accelerated deterioration in the eating practices of the world's most wealthy nation. Nutrition is human ecology and television is a master polluter.

Indices used by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare reveal that malnutrition can be found at all economic levels, although severe and multiple nutrient deficiencies are more common among the poor. The De-

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partment of Agriculture has solid evidence of the decline in the nation's eating habits between 1955 and 1965. A controversial and somewhat hidden National Nutrition Survey demanded by the Congress in 1971 revealed appalling flaws in the nation's dietary practices. The incidence of anemia, vitamin A and calcium deficiencies and caries should frighten any parent, rich or poor.

The outlook for corrective governmental action on food merchandising is not particularly bright. The Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug Administration have considerable responsibilities for the quality of our food supply. Neither is free of food industry influence. The Food and Drug Administration is responsible for the purity of the contents of a food can or package and is just starting to judge the nutrient value of such contents. However, it falls to the Federal Trade Commission to correct individual advertising abuses. At this writing, the nutritional competence of the FTC is unproven and the inclination of its lawyers to judge food messages on legal technicalities rather than nutritional common sense is worrisome. The Federal Communications Commission is the only agency able to dampen the cumulative effect on a child of ten food advertisements per hour. The FCC did force Congress to ban cigarette commercials because of their en masse effect on the public. Similarly, the commission could limit the food messages that bombard the nation's children, but it has not yet chosen to do so.

On Capitol Hill the food industry, with wholesale or retail outlets in every Congressman's legislative district, is not worried. The food lobby slowed Congress' response to the hunger issue in the late 1960s. That same lobby will stall any legislative response to the malnutrition issue. It will also keep federal regulatory agencies understaffed, underequipped and incapable of dealing properly with the $106 billion-a-year food industry.

Action from the private sector is possible but improbable. A few companies are making a complete overhaul of their food development and advertising policies, Pillsbury being notable in this respect. Its recently published statement on advertising and labeling seems a model for corporate advertising relations. Quaker Oats boasts a "nutritional policy," but then undermines it by selling candy with its cereals. General Foods considers its food merchandising and advertising policies a corporate secret.

In another portion of the private world, the National Association of Broadcasters Code Authority and the newly formed National Advertising Review Board have the potential to do corrective work in the advertising of foods. The former has not moved in the food area for the past ten years; the latter is just coming into being. By the spring of 1972, it should become very evident whether these two private self-regulation entities are actively working or whether they are as deceitful as the advertisements they are supposed to monitor. (See "Advertising's Image: Puffery or Effrontery?" by Thomas De Baggio, *The Nation*, January 17.)

It is a time for letter writing and customer complaints, because the country's nutritional health is sufficiently threatened to be a political issue. (Neither party will gain, but the political-economic system must become more responsive.) We can advise our children not to believe in advertisements in comic books, comic pages or on television—particularly if they relate to food—but a more public protest, if it is loud enough and vigorous enough, will get the message through to the food producer's corporate suite. If enough letters land on the FDA's desk or if Sen. Frank Moss, chairman of the consumer subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee, receives enough reminders, the government may come to understand its responsibility to the nation's very public nutritional health.



One lesson that the cereal furor produced is that laymen can challenge professionals to take a long overdue look at the results of their consultancies. Nader calls it "whistleblowing." When the outside gadfly undertakes to precipitate change, persuasion is preferred but panic is more productive. From corporate panic can come quick evaluation of a company's prime responsibilities. Quick reassessment of a politician's leadership responsibilities is also possible. The marketplace may shudder, but reforms do emerge.

After the cereal clash, one of the nation's largest manufacturers of vitamins was besieged by food company executives. "What's a nutrient?" they asked. At least six cereal companies now know. There are still a few thousand other food firms that do not. Only a voluble body of consumers can speed their education. □

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

What We Did with Those Wonderful Craft

AMERICAN SHIPS. *By Alexander Laing. American Heritage Press. 536 pp. $17.50.*

STEPHEN G. NICHOLS, JR.
Mr. Nichols teaches comparative literature at Dartmouth College.

Columbus Day and Thanksgiving, recurring in every school year, oblige children to remember that ships somehow played an important role in the founding of this country. As the pupil progresses through school, he may learn something of the whaling era by reading *Moby Dick* in English class, be told about Robert Fulton's "invention" of the steamboat, and briefly ponder the battle of the Civil War ironclads, *Monitor* and *Merrimac*. The details of this smattering of American maritime history will be less precise in his mind than the doctrines they are meant to illustrate: that America, from its inception, has been a foyer of technological innovation, where ingenuity coupled with daring produced almost every major advance which has shaped the nature of 20th-century existence.

It is part of this dogma that "Americans" brought from Europe the sciences which they were later to refine and extend in response to the need to "conquer" the continent. The achievement, rather than the motivation and cost, occupies the principal focus in such thinking, placing an inordinate emphasis upon originality and efficiency as opposed to tradition and suitability. Seen from this perspective, American maritime history begins with Columbus' ships or the *Mayflower*, and ends with nuclear submarines capable of girdling the world without surfacing.

Alexander Laing's *American Ships* undertakes to do more than rectify popular misconceptions about American maritime history—no mean feat in itself. Unobtrusively, it sets out to revise our whole image of ourselves and our relationship to the world at large and our environment in particular. Laing does not seek to denigrate the role of innovation in American history; on the contrary, he states that "my main theme is a talent for innovation developed by peoples of the Americas as they shaped materials at hand into watercraft answering to their specific needs and circumstances."

But innovation, for Laing, is not solely a manifestation of the European technological heritage. One of his particular bêtes noires is the condescending attitude toward indigenous American watercraft design on the part of European explorers who failed to appreciate that ship design was not a matter of a platonic ideal, of an ultimate craft (conceived, naturally, by Europeans) that would suit all conditions and purposes. "Civilized" observers of "primitive" cultures are often obtuse in judging what is before them: the European explorers could not recognize that American boats were highly specialized craft evolved to meet specific local conditions and needs. In the best sense, they were the product of a close interrelationship between man and his environment.

The difference between the native craft of the Americas and the European ships emerges in this book less as a matter of maritime technology than as posing a profound philosophical question: should man use technology to dominate, and perhaps finally destroy his environment, or should he use technology in such a way as to foster a beneficial relationship with that environment? The latter was the reigning practice before the coming of the European with his philosophy of *exploiting* resources that had previously served principally for survival. Ironically, these diametrically opposing viewpoints converged during the long period of colonization to profoundly influence the evolution of ship design in the New World, particularly in North America.

Although Europeans had at first tended to view with scorn the often radically different designs of indigenous craft, such as the Peruvian balsa raft with its system of guara boards, the kayak and umiak of the Eskimo, and the Indian birchbark canoe, the early settlers soon learned to appreciate the superior qualities of such craft for the needs of the new colonies. Almost from the beginning, shipbuilding in North America showed the influence of native design, particularly in small craft, as traditional European designs and construction techniques were modified to adapt them to local conditions. It is Laing's contention that marine design and technology—as with so many other aspects of the "European" culture—may be primarily ascribed to economic or military needs. The bulk of Laing's book is devoted to demonstrating how these two motivating forces shaped the evolution of shipbuilding in North America. The history of American whaling provides the principal theme of the work, since it constitutes the most striking example of conflict between indigenous and European approaches to the resources of the New World.

Watercraft designed for the express purpose of sealing and whaling are among the oldest boats known to have been fashioned by the native Americans. European settlers turned to native designs at first because they were quieter and more agile—the chief qualities required of pursuing craft—than the heavier European boats. The Indian bark canoe and the Eskimo kayak (particularly the latter) represented in Laing's words, "a rightness that blended continually into the lives of its developers . . . as pure and uncluttered in conceptual form as a primary formula in scientific research. [The kayak's] persistence in vital use over many centuries, as the best answer to the needs and circumstances of its region, suggests a measure of merit applicable when judging anything else that has been built by man, including whalers of a larger size."

The indigenous designs, once fully evolved, were never superseded because the Indians lived in balance with their environment. The colonists, on the other hand, fished not only for food but for export. For them, whaling soon became an industry founded to compete directly with European fisheries. Beach-based whaling, the earliest kind practiced by the colonists in direct emulation of the Indians and using modifications of Indian craft, soon became impractical as the local grounds were depleted and the hunters forced to go ever farther afield. The expansion of a local enterprise into a worldwide operation—seen by many as a praiseworthy example of Yankee ingenuity—is viewed by Laing as the inevitable result of economic pressures which demanded that man take more than the living environment could readily replace. All whalers, European and American alike, faced the consequences of depleted whaling grounds, necessitating ever more ambitious voyages, but it was the Yankee, especially the Nantucketer, who "evolved a complex social contrivance that by the test of worldwide influence is unexampled in maritime history." This contrivance was the self-contained "detachable hamlet" able to support a population of highly skilled individuals, each with a direct financial interest in the voyage and

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each contributing his talent to the joint venture of reducing huge submersible mammals to barrels of oil and bundles of bone. The Nantucket whaleship was furnished with two principal innovations that made long whaling voyages into the remotest seas possible and profitable: the offshore try works and the cedar whaleboat, the former a Yankee adaptation of a European concept, the latter patterned in design and construction on the Indian birchbark canoe. The brick furnaces, or try works, set up on deck to try the blubber after each kill, enabled New England whalers to stay out longer and roam farther than their European counterparts who brought the rancid and rotting blubber back to port to be tried out on shore. The idea of on-board try works had been tested in the 17th century by Basque whalers, but the hot bricks tended to set the deck afire so the procedure was abandoned as too risky. New Englanders simply built their try works over duck pans filled with sea water.

When the Americans set about to break into offshore whaling, they did not have the economic resources to compete with European fisheries. Poverty obliged them to improvise, and the cedar whaleboat proved to be the single most important device that allowed them to compete successfully, and ultimately surpass, European whalers. Lighter, faster and quieter than its heavy European counterpart, the Yankee whaleboat possessed swiftness in the chase, which might last several miles, and an agility that allowed it "to be brought on and off and so keep out of danger." The beauty and simplicity of this design provided a direct line of continuity between native Americans and the colonists, a continuity unfortunately not carried through in the use to which the cedar whaleboats and their modern descendants were put.

Whaling was not the only preoccupation of the colonies, and Laing isolates two other forces at work in the development of American ship design: commerce and war. With a novelist's flair for narrative, and a poet's sense of irony—he is both poet and novelist—Laing tells a fascinating story of the visionaries who set aside tradition in the quest for faster means of moving ships through water or, in the case of naval design, of removing them violently from their element. Just as he gives indigenous watercraft the credit long overdue them, so Laing looks behind the accepted versions of history to unearth neglected or forgotten men. The resulting account is not only gripping but highly instructive.

Traditionalists accustomed to viewing packets and clipper ships as the ultimate expression of beauty and technology in marine design may be disconcerted by the tenor of the extensive coverage Laing gives to these merchant vessels. For him, ships do not exist in isolation, as objects to be admired with nostalgia for a bygone age. He talks as much or more about men—designers, captains, crews—as he does about the ships themselves. And he talks about the sometimes sinister economic greed that begat the race for speed at all costs. Packets and clippers were the products, indeed the symbols, of an age marred by overreaching. The great records for which clippers and packets are so justly famous were obtained at terrific cost in human suffering, especially for the foredeck hands: ". . . They moved in a nightmare of suffering, in which the lesser tortures of earache, toothache and throbbing boils . . . passed almost unnoticed in the greater agony [of cold] that gripped them from head to foot." The race for speed on packet lines dictated a design for ships "that could sustain merciless driving under unprecedented amounts of sail." Americans specialized in producing and sailing such ships, but they also specialized in taking unprecedented risks: two-fifths of the Black Ball Line packets were wrecked between 1819 and 1855, with almost total loss of passengers and crews.

Although American naval design had experienced a brief moment of glory in the early 1800s thanks to the brilliance of Joshua Humphreys and his "unfair frigates," it was not until the Civil War that this third aspect of American ship design was destined to come into its own. Even then, it was thanks to the efforts of civilian naval architects, like Samuel Hartt Pook, or John Ericsson, that the Navy became innovative. By a delicious quirk of fate, many of the hidebound, retrograde senior naval officers, staunch opponents of innovation, were Southerners. With the outbreak of hostilities they resigned their commissions to offer their dubious services to the Confederacy. For the duration of the war, government funds were made available to civilian designers on the Union side for a variety of projects.

In America, government funds have rarely been advanced for the purpose of supporting research in civilian naval architecture, a practice not only common in other countries but, as Laing shows, one that allowed the government-subsidized British steamship lines to compete with and then supersede American sailing packets. Innovation in whaling and merchant shipping was traditionally left to the whims of private enterprise, with its fatal sensitivity to "boom and bust." The decade prior to the Civil War, the very moment of sail's greatest achievement, ended in a depression ruinous to some of our most noteworthy designer-builders. The Civil War allowed government-subsidized European lines to consolidate their control of Atlantic shipping, a supremacy never relinquished. The war, combined with the discovery of earth oil in Pennsylvania, also proved disastrous to American whaling. Nantucket and New Bedford gave way to San Francisco as the center of the whaling industry which continued into the early 20th century.

The final venue of American whaling was the Arctic, where it had begun almost 4,000 years before. For Laing, the greatest moment for American whaling in the 20th century was the decision in the fall of 1970 by Secretary of the Interior Walter Hickel to place an embargo on all whale products. Advances in technology, particularly the modern whale factory ship—a nightmarish descendant of the "detachable hamlets" of Nantucket—have all but exterminated the whale from the world's oceans. The U.S. embargo constituted an important moral sanction against such senseless slaughter, allowing Laing to conclude his work on a somberly tempered note of optimism:

> If we are lucky, man's greatest achievement of the next few years may be his realization at last that everything he makes and uses—not forgetting his ships—should be designed to work no injury upon the natural world, within which his own survival is linked more than symbolically to the long survival of leviathan. □

A SEARCH

The pebbles along this clear stream
are just so placed . . .
some displayed, some buried . . .
some settling into the earth

and moss throbs in the current edge
below these shallow rapids
which roar away my concentration . . .

An owl is studying me. He knows
these woods are no place for books.
I would put them away

and canoe with slow strokes
to this stream's beginning, stopping
for flowers and mushrooms

and to peer into dark burrows.
But the soles of my bare feet feel
the tap roots of young oaks cracking

the skulls of our grand
fathers, and I have seen babes
start in their sleep

and in these books I search
for some thing that keeps me
from what I would.

Michael Niflis

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'Unacknowledged Legislators'?

IMAGINATION AND POWER: A Study of Poetry on Public Themes. *By Thomas R. Edwards. Oxford University Press. 232 pp. $7.50.*

CHARLES MOLESWORTH
Mr. Molesworth teaches English at Queens College. He has published poetry and criticism in Salmagundi, Poetry, University Review *and* Genre.

It is possible to see media as the secularization of legend. If Joe Namath, for example, is a culture hero it is not because of some bardic mythification performed for the sake of a superstition-ridden audience. Rather, it is a result of the press conference and the photograph, printed and beamed. Legendary figures, from Tristan to Napoleon, could not have thrived, nor probably even existed, before a battery of microphones. No political figure since Gandhi has had legendary dimensions; the current world leaders are all the result of background briefings and staffs loaded with field research. This is at least one explanation of the lack of great political art in the last three decades. Poetry, whatever its powers, is at a disadvantage in competing with a director of communications.

These, and many more related problems, are brought to mind by Thomas Edwards' new book. The argument throughout is diffident and subtle. It establishes no comprehensive theory of political power; neither does it work out of, or toward, a rigid aesthetic theory. It can easily be labeled arbitrary in its selection of poems—why Dryden's "The Medal" and not "Absalom and Achitophel," for example? And while its general drift is chronological it discusses no poem in detail between Wordsworth's "October, 1803" and Yeats's "Easter, 1916," a clean gap of what we can only call, with embarrassing understatement, a politically important century.

Still this book is thoughtful and imaginative. As Edwards says, "It seems more sensible to limit myself to speculating about the ways in which poets have imagined the 'public world,' ways which tell us more about the poets . . . than about the public events themselves." The order of words in the title is crucial.

Of course, Edwards cannot discuss the imagined public event without some grasp of the historic events which it shapes and is shaped by. Edwards is a liberal, not the recently retrenched variety but the evolving sort. He is a man of humane concerns about individual worth and happiness; he feels conscience-bound continuously to illuminate, if only for his own sake, the moral shape of polity.

The first chapter, in many ways the most exciting, is called "The Disappearance of Heroic Man." It deals with Marlowe's Tamburlaine, Shakespeare's Coriolanus, Milton's Satan and Butler's Hudibras, and traces a shift "from the moral nature of power, and its relation to the existing sources of authority, to the question of how private men can participate in or resist power as it touches on their lives and property." This period saw the appearance of a new sense of "property," and the private accumulation of capital which supplanted the feudal order. Edwards' reflections on this could easily, and profitably, be supplemented by the work of such historians as Christopher Hill or C. H. George. But Edwards' "failure" to use such resources does not invalidate his argument. And in later chapters he does quite skillfully employ terms and concepts borrowed from Namier and Georg Lukacs.

Following the introduction, in order, are chapters on Spenser and Marvell, the 18th century, the English Romantics, and, in conclusion, one on Yeats, Eliot, Auden and Lowell. A clue to the special habits of mind that Edwards exhibits is a note that refers to Empson's *Some Types of Pastoral* as "the great book of modern criticism." This book, of course, is a classic example of how a good critic can turn all knowledge, historical and ideological, to the service of an individual lyric poem. In each of Edwards' chapters, individual poems receive sensitive, and occasionally controversial, readings, as is the case with Blake's lyrics, especially "Ah! Sun Flower" and "The Sick Rose." His using the short poems rather than the prophetic works (which Edwards sees as having too much "the status of personal property") in order to examine the poet's political imagination could in itself easily enrage the inveterate Blakean.

But Edwards has his wisdom, too. Often the book is graced with valuable political and aesthetic insights, as when he says, "Deploring something is not the same thing as taking it seriously—the first step in coming to terms with force is surely not to locate it in some . . . moral scale but to confront and believe in the reality of its consequences." This, it seems to me, can tell us as much about the current state of politics in America as it can about the audience's reaction to Tamburlaine's violence.

If it's true that it's impossible to write political satire today because reality has become self-satirizing (I think Philip Roth's *Our Gang* proves the point), this may be the result of our inability to take politics seriously though we continue automatically to deplore it. The appearance of Edwards' book suggests that our age is one of the most self-consciously political, while his very diffidence is, in part, a measure of our lack of operative moral intelligence where questions of power are involved.

Near the end of the book, Edwards quotes Lowell's poem on Eisenhower's inauguration in January 1953. The literal scene of the poem is a ride in a vehicle stuck on the icy streets of New York. Here are the last lines of the poem:

> *Ice, ice. Our wheels no longer move.*
> *Look, the fixed stars, all just alike*
> *as lack-land atoms, split apart,*
> *and the Republic summons Ike,*
> *the mausoleum in her heart.*

The Empsonian delicacy with which the analysis of this poem proceeds—with just the right sense of its puns, its flirtation with bathos, its imagistic logic, and its final, though ambiguous seriousness—is a tribute to Edwards' skill as a critic. The poem is also, I suspect, closer than most of the others in the book to his own political sensibility. In speaking of another Lowell poem, Edwards says that "public issues are taken into the mind and there allowed to represent opposing impulses . . . the impulse to accept . . . 'exterior' reality and the impulse to question its value and authenticity." The concern with authenticity is as

THE GATHERING

At my age my father
held me on his arm
like a hooded bird,
and his father held him so.
Now I grow into brotherhood
with my father as he
with his has grown,
time teaching me
his thoughts in my own.
Now he speaks in me
as when I knew him first,
as his father spoke
in him when he had come
to thirst for the life
of a young son. My son
will know me in himself
when his son sits hooded on
his arm and I have grown
to be brother to all
my fathers, memory
speaking to knowledge,
finally, in my bones.

Wendell Berry

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crucial to Edwards' imagination as it is to Lowell's. Lionel Trilling says the modern writer not only refuses to assent to the world's values but eventually denies the world his credence.

Like Empson, Edwards sets a value on ambiguity, but he stops short of losing himself in skepticism because of his insistent moral concern—the moral obligation to be intelligent. Edwards has written a work much more about the mind of the poet than about the power of the king, minister or politician. But by being so sinuously true to its own partial truths, the book finally does tell us about power as well as imagination.

Perhaps only in an age in which a political ode would *have* to be comic, and where the electronic patterns on our TV screen may be all there *is* of "the Administration," such ambiguity as Edwards' is itself heroic. Perhaps all the power left us is the chance to save the sanctuary of our individual minds from media pollution. Perhaps only in America does a man feel forced to write more intelligently about imagined reality than about political "events." (It's a symptom of what I'm getting at that I feel forced to put quotation marks around the last word.) The power to control imagination, thereby destroying it, may turn out to be the final political evil. That's an intellectualistic formulation of the nature of political power, but it is to this book's credit that it reminds us that such a possiblity is more than an aesthetic problem. □

See Also Fudge, *Verb Transitive*

THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS FUDGE FACTORY. *By John Franklin Campbell. Basic Books. 298 pp. $6.95.*

AARON SEGAL
Mr. Segal is associate professor of government at Cornell University.

We are living through the end of the American Empire. It is a painful process, still far from complete, that drastically alters the relationships between this country and the rest of the world. We are used to calling the shots. We have inherited from the days when we were indisputably on top a grotesque machine for making foreign policy that Joseph Kraft wittily dubbed "the foreign affairs fudge factory."

The late John Franklin Campbell was a product of that fudge factory and one of its most intelligent critics. He had a vision of a world in which the United States was neither dominant nor isolated, and in which its foreign policy was subject to rational control and direction. A graduate of Harvard and Berkeley, he entered the U.S. Foreign Service in the halcyon Kennedy days when the United States still had a sense of world mission. His rapid career rise contradicted the normal pattern of a diplomatic corps that has many of the symptoms of a gerontocracy. He served as an assistant to Under Secretary of State George Ball, and then had an assignment as U.S. consul general in Asmara, Ethiopia. His superiors had him marked out for still better things and choice Washington posts were offered to him.

John Campbell was a man of exuberant humor. He took a temporary leave of absence from the State Department to write this book and to edit the new and lively anti-Establishment quarterly, *Foreign Policy*. His journalistic talents as well as his comic sense found their appropriate exercise in exploding the pomposities of the bureaucracy in which he had served his apprenticeship. Yet he fully intended before his unexpected death at 31 to return to the State Department and a diplomatic career. Unlike many of his contemporaries who abandoned liberalism and its ideals of public service in disillusion, John Campbell was committed to gradualism and to working within the system. His mind focused on the machinery and how to reform it, and he has left us a sturdy and useful book on the subject.

It is clear that the State Department has lost control over foreign policy. Despised by the Populists as a haven for incompetent snobs, raked over by everyone from the late Sen. Joseph McCarthy to the organization experts, bereft of friends in Congress, and with a budget inadequate for its mission, the State Department fights to get an occasional word in edgewise on foreign policy matters. Outweighed by the CIA, the Pentagon, the Defense Department, the National Security Council, and thirty other agencies of the federal government who have permanent staff overseas, it has reacted to its loss of political importance with a singular bureaucratic stunt: it has enormously expanded its staff. The result is an organization that must be cut in half if it is ever to function effectively.

As an insider, at once committed and detached, Campbell analyzes the evolution of the foreign policy-making machinery during the growth of the United States as a global superpower. He traces the effects of numerous commissions, studies, reforms, and Presidents which amount to the steady erosion of the power and authority of the State Department, and the substitution of Presidential policy making through the White House entourage; the last Secretary of State who had the ear of a President was John Foster Dulles. One result is an overemphasis on military and defense considerations, which are in any case more than adequately represented in the National Security Council and other White House channels.

Indeed, the State Department was never in the bidding for control of the new instruments of foreign policy: in Campbell's terms, the economic bureaucracies and the intelligence and propaganda complexes. The CIA and the Defense Department, to name only two of the agencies involved, have a global intelligence apparatus which dwarfs that of State and which is in no way responsible to U.S. ambassadors. The Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture Departments have taken international economic policy away from State. Even the less glamorous task of exporting the American image has been captured by the United States Information Agency. In spite of its being out of a job the State Department carries on its personnel numbers game, and uses its resources chiefly in make-work.

Campbell's response to these conditions was a program to resuscitate the State Department and make it once more an important instrument of foreign policy. He proposed a leaner department that would control a single U.S. foreign affairs budget, with all overseas representatives coming under its authority. He wanted to move it closer to the White House, physically and spiritually, abolish USIA and turn over U.S. cultural programs overseas as well as the Peace Corps to quasi-independent agencies. The competing intelligence networks would also be made subject to State Department control and direction, and the National Security Council be confined to narrow military issues. Foreign economic policy would be coordinated in a sub-department of State.

It is odd that so astute an observer should propose to renovate State through executive action while bypassing Congress, and fail to discuss the question of the caliber of the Secretary of State compared to that of other Presidential appointees. Unable to gain Congressional or popular support, State is in fact incapable of reforming itself and unwilling to allow others to do the job. At bottom, then, this thoughtful, sensible book tells us how to tinker with the machinery but leaves aside the question of where the vessel should be headed. The foreign affairs fudge factory remains intact be-

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cause we are not yet ready to abandon the global remnants of the American Empire in favor of new relationships. Probably that policy will have to change before we can expect the house that it built to fall to the ground. On the other hand, the example of the Byzantine Empire shows that the trappings of power, including the hordes of redundant civil servants, often outlive the imperial substance. When the substance itself is fudge, who can say how long the trappings can carry on with their fudging of foreign affairs? □

Good News and Bad Times

THE GOSPEL SOUND. *By Tony Heilbut. Simon & Schuster. 350 pp. $7.95.*

TOM BETHELL
Mr. Bethell is at present completing a book on New Orleans jazz to be published by the University of California Press.

Among black contributions to the American musical heritage, gospel music—a vague term referring to the general body of music either performed in church or inspired by Christianity—remains today virtually unexplored by white audiences. It is probably no coincidence that gospel music is also the most vital musical tradition in America today. While jazz now survives largely on wax and Vinylite, and the blues are rapidly being sanitized in the cultural centers, gospel music remains a living art, contributing to a distinctive way of life.

Before long it too will be subjected to the scrutiny and analysis of musicologists and folklorists. In any case, Tony Heilbut's book is the first general survey of the field, and its publication may herald a general exploration of the genre. Since we live in a period of widespread examination of America's cultural roots —ragtime, for instance, has only recently been discovered by the intelligentsia which has until now preferred its music to sound as European as possible—gospel music will have its turn. May the day be postponed—for the evidence of the past more than suggests that art forms are most healthy when they are least suspected of being artistic.

Meanwhile, gospel music is still flourishing. Its professional singers are continually on the road—the Gospel Highway—performing at concerts all over the country. Apart from Mahalia Jackson, almost the only singer whose name is familiar to white audiences, their names (Dorothy Coates, Bessie Griffin, Alex Bradford, James Cleveland) are not household words. Heilbut gives us a chapter-by-chapter account of the lives of the major gospel singers, and he describes the vicissitudes of the gospel life. He has been observing the field for fifteen years—he must have been the only white person in sight at many performances, to judge by those I have attended recently in the South—and his knowledge is expert as his research is detailed.

Although their concerts are generally well attended, the professionals are underpaid, and in many respects, as Heilbut shows, seem to be dogged by bad luck. They are preyed on by black preachers (a class to which someone ought to devote a full-scale study), and exploited by disc jockeys. The field has been largely ignored by the major recording companies, although the number of labels of all descriptions which issue records of gospel groups must be huge. Many of these are tiny operations—a store minded by a self-styled preacher, where religious artifacts of all kinds are sold, while the back room is a recording studio presided over by a "professor" who may also give piano lessons. Many local amateur groups are recorded in such places, and their work issued on 45 rpm singles for ghetto consumption. The profusion and, oddly enough, the underground character of this activity testify to the vitality of the music.

There are literally thousands of gospel groups in the United States, nearly all of them amateur, some with as many as ten members. They work during the week at jobs which may range from school teaching to construction. They get together at weekends for church functions, or perform on local radio stations —sometimes buying their own radio time —with little more incentive than the pleasure of singing together. It is, in short, the grass-roots movement which has contributed more than any other to contemporary music. There is hardly a popular singer today who has not been to some extent influenced by gospel music (I was interested to learn that Elvis Presley attended the East Trigg Baptist Church in Memphis where he

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CHARLES A. WELLS, editor and publisher of **Between The Lines**, has had many years of experience in journalism, both on daily papers and news services. He travels frequently abroad – to Asia, Russia, the Mideast, Europe and Latin America. As a birthright member of the Society of Friends (Quakers), he early felt the need for this kind of reporting.

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COMMENT FROM A READER: "As an educator, I've decided that the most important commodity today is information, facts, hard-to-get-at truths. The increasing substitution of TV for reading has made this imperative. I don't always agree – but **Between The Lines** keeps your readers aware of trends and braced for changes."

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heard much superb gospel singing), and many famous vocalists started their careers as gospel singers. Sam Cooke, Little Richard, Wilson Pickett, Dionne Warwicke and, of course, Aretha Franklin fall into this category.

Heilbut well captures the peculiar sadness of the gospel scene deriving from this circumstance. The gospel professionals' songs, styles and verses are continually pirated by secular performers who not infrequently make fortunes out of the proceeds. A gospel singer whose material has been stolen in this way almost never bothers to take the matter to law. He realizes the inappropriateness of such a step. There is an almost inevitable conflict between the natural desire for wealth and acclaim in this world, and the constant reminder in the very words of the gospel song that the singer places his faith in an otherworldly kingdom. It is a poignant conflict—good news and bad times, as Heilbut aptly puts it—which has resolved itself in some of the finest music of our day. □

Flaubert the Chaste

FLAUBERT THE MASTER: A Critical and Biographical Study (1856-1880). *By Enid Starkie. Atheneum Publishers. 390 pp. $10.*

E. SANIEL BROOK
Ms Brook is associate professor of French at Hofstra University.

Enid Starkie's first volume on Flaubert was *The Making of the Master* (1967); it carried the reader through the publication of *Madame Bovary* and its aftermath. Like that book, the new volume represents extensive research, and together they fulfill the author's ambition to provide a full-scale study of the man and his works—albeit in the style of a portrait flat-painted rather than impasto.

After *Madame Bovary* (1856), Flaubert's most serious and important novel was *L'Education sentimentale,* which was not in its final form until 1869. Miss Starkie devotes much space to her account of that book—understandably enough, since it is unique in its power to evoke the century of disillusionment. It encompasses the February 1848 Revolution, the Second Republic and several years of the era of Napoleon III.

The working class and the intellectuals of the period were the principal sufferers from the regime's determination to stifle all dissent. The weapon used against the workers was the outlawing of all economic and political organizations; in the case of the intellectuals, the desired conformism was achieved by the imposition of general censorship. While many of the latter went into exile, others adopted strategies that would enable them to continue to write in France. Perhaps they were relieved to have a respite from social turbulence, especially since the Second Empire seemed to usher in a period of material prosperity. The most notorious of these figures was Sainte-Beuve. Miss Starkie documents her appraisal of the relationship between him and Flaubert with ample citations of their correspondence. Her conclusion, that Flaubert was a cut above the critic as regards political morality, seems sound enough.

As a young man, Flaubert had flirted with the revolution, but *L'Education sentimentale* makes clear the short-lived character of that infatuation—in contrast with his enduring passion for Mme Schlésinger (Mme Arnoux in the novel). Miss Starkie assesses this major work as "a novel of failures," and it is not difficult to follow her reasoning. But the book is far more than the psychological novel the biographer sees; it is a work of penetrating social and political insight. To read it is to appreciate its truth, vitality and relevance to our own times.

Enid Starkie died in April 1971. It is tempting to believe that she might otherwise have revised *Flaubert the Master* to improve its style and to endow her Flaubert with the sinew and sensuality he had in life. Perhaps too she would have judged her treatment of history and politics to be inadequate. In any case, it is evident that certain personal characteristics get in her way as a biographer.

Yes, Miss Starkie is a puritan, and that is her affair. But to choose Flaubert as a subject and refuse to modify her bent to accommodate his is to guarantee an inaccurate portrait. Then, too, she adopts André Maurois' system of using index cards unwinnowed, just as they were delivered by the researchers. She not only treads that path but appears to be his willing disciple in verbosity and undisciplined use of detail. And the reader is surfeited with expressions like "as we shall see in a later chapter" and speculation announced by "it seems." Miss Starkie may well have considered the latter an indication of scholarly caution. On innumerable occasions she appeals to the absence of proof. There is no proof, she reflects, that Flaubert and one or another of the expensive women of imperial France occupied the same bed the same night. And in the absence of proof Miss Starkie usually opts for purity: "It is very unlikely that she and Flaubert ever became lovers; but he wrote to her as if with deep love."

Translation is a demanding art, and Miss Starkie is frequently guilty of offering as English literal renditions from the French. *Je regrette Rouen,* comes out "I regret Rouen," and *Il a marié sa nièce* is rendered "He married his niece." Flaubert is supposed to have asked in a letter to an admirer, *"Comment va l'esprit?"* which in Miss Starkie's version becomes "How is your mind?" These ineptitudes necessarily raise doubts about the author's scholarship.

It is doubtful that Enid Starkie's repeated expressions of dislike for Balzac add to one's understanding of Gustave Flaubert. Her criteria are puzzling: "There are many more evil characters in Balzac than in Flaubert, who has never drawn anyone as black as Vautrin." Miss Starkie does give some excellent selections from Flaubert's correspondence; for the reader's purposes they would be even better had she consulted Steegmuller's *Selected Letters* as a model for decent English. On the Commune, there are ample quotations which make understandable Jean-Paul Sartre's intense opposition to Flaubert on this head, but the author also prints several of Flaubert's attenuated judgments on "the tragedy" he considered the Commune to be, and these show him as less ferocious.

Despite her loathing for Flaubert's Rabelaisian side, she quotes some examples of his "lewdness," his "salaciousness" and, what may be more damning, his occasional churlishness. Of quotations to infuriate the advocates of women's liberation there is no end, and they are picturesque. From them the reader can learn as much about Flaubert as about his biographer. When all is said and done, however, it is hard to account for the fulsome praise accorded the book by journals in this country and in Britain. The plain fact is that Flaubert deserves better. □

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ART / Lawrence Alloway

On the weekend of January 8-9, the Museum of Modern Art was host to a symposium on "Institutions for a Post-Technological Society: the Universitas Project." It was one phase of a study initiated by Emilio Ambasz of the Department of Architecture and Design at the museum. A book of the proceedings is planned and the project entertains the possibility of founding "a new type of education-research-development institution concerned with the evaluation and design of our man-made environment."

Maybe the best approach to a university of design is to consider the present status of design as a subject in the curriculum. It usually ranges from architecture to packaging, the spectrum of artifacts for public access and multiple use. The teaching of design has rested largely in the hands of architects; when it is taught, industrial design, a comparatively recent subject, figures as an offshoot of architecture, with a backup from engineers and commercial artists. A glance at the man-made environment produced by generations of designers trained in this way does not support the view that the system is working. In 1968 Ambasz made the point that architects had failed completely "to provide design-solutions to environmental problems." The profession is conservative, unsystematic and piecemeal. Thus the Universitas project is concerned with both teaching and environmental reforms.

The Bauhaus, for all its influence on architecture and product design between the wars, does not provide an adequate model, though Meyer Schapiro (Columbia University) spoke highly of it at the symposium. One reason is that the Bauhaus conceived its design objects in terms of a semantically meager functionalism. As has been pointed out by Gui Bonsiepe, the Bauhaus preceded development of the communications industry in relation to mass production. The result is that we have today a notion of the complex and extensive significations of objects that was not possible in the puritanical mode of Bauhaus mechanization.

The relevant institution for a changing conception of design, after the Bauhaus and before the Universitas project, was the Hochschule für Gestaltung at Ulm, under Tomás Maldonado's direction in the 1960s. (Bonsiepe's argument, referred to above, appeared in the journal, *Ulm*, in 1965 and Ambasz, like Maldonado an Argentine, has been a visiting professor at the Hochschule.) Maldonado was expected at the symposium but did not appear; his paper was supposed to have been about the teaching of semiology—the science of signs. One of the significant innovations at Ulm was that the design process was not isolated as either a purely formal exercise or as a technical operation, but was set in a broad context of sign systems, such as those covered by semiology. It was the only school of design to use sophisticated systems of analysis, beyond those adequate to a craft or trade school and which still prevail at all art schools and most university art departments.

Ambasz, despite his up-to-date methodology, separates design from science. He considers that "the aim of design . . . is to create an order in the world," whereas science's "aim is to reveal an order that already exists in the world." "The task of science is the analysis of the given, that of design the synthesis of the new." He argues that "the scientist's commitment to the given" will predispose him to perpetuate present values and to envisage "the future as a prolongation of the present." Though that is a tenable criticism of short-term applied scientific methods, it does not do justice to the fundamental changes in concepts of the world introduced by science in the past thirty years. It has, too, the disadvantage of assigning to the designer a terribly responsible but rather vague function.

Letters OF LOUIS D. Brandeis

Vol. I (1870-1907): Urban Reformer

Vol. II (1907-1912): People's Attorney

Vols. III-V *in preparation*

Edited by Melvin I. Urofsky and David W. Levy

"The letters move over a wide range of Brandeis' reform activities. . . . Today more than a few American social commentators pooh-pooh such efforts as superficial grandstanding and a facile accommodation with the system that does not get to the root of the problem. Brandeis would have readily agreed that far from trying to overturn established institutions, he sought to secure them by making them responsive to the needs of lower-income groups. Yet this volume of letters, as much as any documentation we have, makes plain that activities of the Brandeis type were neither easy nor trivial. With day-by-day force they spell out just how dangerous the dominant conditions of the early 20th century were to any tenable conception of democracy and just what talent, hard work and guts it took to change a single part of them."—*The New York Times Book Review.*

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He has been endowed with some of the seerlike attributes of the artist, but is expected "to create the future" in objective terms as well.

In fact, both of the two main methods used to formulate design problems at the symposium were scientific. The French contributors relied mostly on linguistics and the Americans on General Systems Theory, one to define absolute structures, the other to define total situations. It is hard to see how a designer in Ambasz's sense of the term could operate without these techniques. Without science the designer cannot possibly act on the scale demanded by the demographic pileup of the 20th century.

The Universitas project has three purposes, to quote from the working paper: (*1*) to devise a program for the design and management of the man-made environment; (*2*) to question whether present ideas and institutions of design are satisfactory, and (*3*) to advance new ideas for the reshaping of artifacts and the restructuring of universities. It is assumed, and reasonably, that the man-made environment is not working well enough. One sign of this is our renewed sense of economic society as a zero sum game, that is a game in which a winner gains only at the expense of losers. Previously, as Daniel Bell has pointed out, high productivity made it possible to view economics as a non-zero sum game, the outcome of which did not have to be described in win-lose symmetries but which represented a range of differential gains. The sense of losing is back. A strong motivating factor in assessing the environment, it has led to doubt about the value of current ideas and organizations for ecological restoration, control and development.

The project was begun with support from the Graham Foundation and the Noble Foundation and the symposium was co-sponsored by the museum and the Brionvega Corporation, Italy, implemented by a grant from Mrs. Douglas Auchincloss. It is not clear yet how it is proposed to fund the project in the future on a bigger scale. In the history of institutions there are two kinds of innovation: one is innovation within professional norms which takes the form of improving performance skills and levels of knowledge; the other is innovation that questions the legitimacy of the field of knowledge and reevaluates the role of the institution itself. Ambasz's project is of the latter radical type, as noted by Manuel Castells (Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris): "an institution dedicated to changing the environment must necessarily be in the camp of social change and in opposition to the established order." Will the corporations responsible for environmental deterioration be interested in supporting a critical body? And, if corporate support were forthcoming, would the university be able to resist pressures to conform?

The problem came into the open at one of the working sessions, when Edward Logue (New York State Urban Development Corporation), after a sneer at the "rarefied atmosphere" of the symposium, stressed that only the power elite could afford to pay the faculty. Logue welcomed the Universitas project, provided that it turned out to be a better problem-solving institution than current universities. Ernst Jantsch (University of California at Berkeley) rejected this view of education, pointing out that training on this basis merely meant the duplication of existing work. Rexford Guy Tugwell (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara) also rejected Logue's service view of education by insisting on the separation of the demand for and the supply of knowledge, as essential to resisting business domination on campus. How to fund the Universitas project, then, without selling it to its backers? How to preserve deviance and dissent?

The range of contributors to the symposium was impressive, including Hannah Arendt, Stuart Hampshire, Henri Lefebre, Octavio Paz, Anatol Rapoport and Meyer Schapiro. An exceptionally good paper was by Ronald Dworkin (Oxford University): "if a reason can be supplied for a 'new' value then it is not really new; if none can be supplied then it is not really a value." He resolved the dilemma by describing new values as extrapolations from "the community's institutional practice." The French group—Jean Beaudrillard, Castells and Alain Touraine—came on strong with an unbeatable mixture of Marxism and dogmatic skepticism concerning the project. By comparison, the American contributors were handicapped by their interest in seeing if the project might possibly be made to work, something that did not interest the visiting French at all. The French speakers relied heavily, to quote Lefebre, on "the events of May 1968, which have set the problem of a new society." Possession of this small but unmistakable moment of recent revolution had the effect of making the French rather prim. The American conscience was spread wide and, by comparison, ineffectually expressed.

In the event, the chairmen of the working sessions were central: two of the four were admirable. Hampshire (Wadham College, Oxford) and Carl Schorske (Princeton University) knew what their panelists' papers were about and took discussion forward from there. On the other hand, Thomas Sebeok (Indiana University) had the idea of running his session by listing some pairs he had noticed in the papers (play and culture, code and message) and then withdrawing as the discussion foundered under the weight of prepared speeches doggedly delivered by speakers unable to think on their feet. The session run by Arthur Drexler (director of the museum's Department of Architecture and Design) was virtually leaderless: he made no effort to cope with the larger issues that came up, but pursued at inordinate length a tiny and dubious technical device mentioned by the only architect on the panel. His stupid patience in this quest had the effect of shutting Hannah Arendt out of the dialogue.

The first audience of the Universitas project consisted of the contributors who received and sometimes read one another's papers. The second audience was the invited group at the museum, who put in two eight-hour days at the symposium. The third audience should include designers and academics concerned with the problems. The papers will lead to a book—when the museum's publication department can get to it—but, in the meantime, the issues should not be dropped or merely stored. Aside from dissemination of the papers by the participants, it is hoped that the architecture and design department plans to make the project working paper and the abstracts available to interested people. The symposium was too good a beginning for the next step to be merely publication of the book after a time lag.

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That will put some of the essays out of date. A bridge should be maintained between that phase and the symposium itself. □

FILMS

ROBERT HATCH

Utamaro and His Five Women, directed by Kenji Mizoguchi, is a series of picaresque episodes derived from the life of one of Japan's most celebrated creators of popular wood prints. Utamaro is valued especially for his prints of women, and the film shows him embracing with his art the professional beauties of his day, while his associates, followers and the girls he immortalizes engage in affairs, parties, quarrels, elopements, even murder as the ultimate expression of love (the killer, she tells Utamaro, is as dedicated to the demands of her heart as he to the demands of his brushes).

Utamaro emerges in the picture as a humane, concerned, but masterful ascetic in a world of pleasure, but if the *Encyclopaedia*'s brief account of his life is accurate, this is a somewhat prettified version of the facts. I suspect that Mizoguchi has created a *Vie de Bohème* of 18th-century Japan, taking what liberties he pleases with the career of a man whose seductive plates have pleased a broad public, in the West as well as the East, for 200 years. But the result does not strike me as being equivalent to the vulgar sentimentalities promoted in the screen biographies of Van Gogh and Toulouse-Lautrec. Mizoguchi's work is ingeniously plotted, witty, richly characterized and stylish. Particularly, it is stylish. The superbly disciplined cast moves and poses, communicates and performs routine tasks with deftness, grace and a repertory of nuances. The players move through the sparest of elegant settings, dressed in costumes that flatter them with perfect tact, and so adjust their demeanors according to who they are, where they are and whom they confront that they seem brilliantly responsive to life.

It is possible that I overemphasize this element of style, being aware that it has almost vanished from our society. We have lost the art of entering a room, of bowing, of offering a cup or a chair; it is easily a generation since any man among us has removed his hat with a flourish. Our contemporary theatre provides no opportunity for elegant deportment; only in the ballet is it retained, and there it seems no longer an idealization of conventional manners but a fantastic invention.

Style is not mere decoration; it has moral content. It expresses respect for self as well as for others and acknowledges gradients of age and accomplishment, of intelligence and worth, in the absence of which social intercourse becomes a stew of insecurity and brash striving. Thus *Utamaro and His Five Women* derives moral substance out of the scapegrace world in which a vernacular artist found his inspiration. The manners that the film evokes are no doubt archaic in Japan, though I gather that they are not yet extinct there. In any case, Mizoguchi has the wisdom to relish them.

Claude Chabrol's *Le Boucher* is a thoroughly professional picture, made presumably for sound commercial reasons. That is, I suspect that the director wanted to exercise a competent cast in some rigorous events set against an attractive background, and to attract thereby a sufficiently large and respectful audience. The endeavor strikes me as canny and, given the subject matter, it estranges me.

Le Boucher is a psychological suspense story, of which the psychology is perfunctory and the suspense a cliché. The setting, in and around Tremolat in the Dordogne, is authentically beautiful. As for the suspense, when a film is called *The Butcher,* and when the protagonist of that trade (Jean Yanne) is given to recalling compulsively the cadavers he has seen as a soldier in Vietnam and Algeria, it requires no great insight to recognize who is committing a series of savage murders in the neighborhood. The mad butcher's lady friend (Stéphane Audran) is allegedly a more interesting case. An attractive young schoolmistress, she has suffered an unhappy love affair, and now sublimates her emotions in nourishing the minds of the young. Thus the butcher's doglike devotion promotes him to the position of favorite child and when, at the scene of one of the killings, she finds proof of his guilt, she suppresses the evidence and lies to the police. Follow then scenes of terror in which the teacher imagines that she is to be the next victim. But no, the butcher turns his knife upon himself and dying slowly, confesses his maudlin adoration.

All this is too distasteful for entertainment and too superficial for serious narrative. At least, I am not entertained by the sight of blood dripping from an overhanging rock upon a schoolgirl's picnic sandwich. And if I am to become seriously concerned about a woman who hides evidence found beside a mutilated body—and then on insufficient grounds jumps to the conclusion that her suspicion is false—I want to know more about her than that she was once jilted and has substituted pedagogy for romance. *Le Boucher* traffics in trivial horror; it is an example of the domesticated violence that degrades our time.

* * *

Violent America: The Movies 1946-1964 by Lawrence Alloway, is published by The Museum of Modern Art ($7.95. Paper $4.95). The book is an outgrowth of a film series, "The American Action Movie," which Mr. Alloway prepared in 1969 for the museum.

It is the author's thesis that the popular film (as opposed to those examples generally conceded to be "art") is both overfamiliar and understudied. He essays to remedy that situation, relating the pictures he discusses to the society at large, and particularly to its preoccupation with violence. □

STAGE & FILM

Harold Clurman

In *The Nation* of November 29, 1971, speaking of Fernando Arrabal's play, *And They Put Handcuffs on Flowers,* I said that "I wished to compare the relative effectiveness of theatre and film in the depiction of brutality and horror." I was unable to do so at the time because I had not yet seen *Viva La Muerte* (Hurrah for Death) which caused a sensation at the Cannes Film Festival last May. I have now seen the film, directed by Arrabal himself. It is on view in New York at the St. Marks Cinema every midnight of the week, and every morning at the Elgin Theatre.

The film packs a terrific wallop. It does so in its least "realistic" images—to be more precise, in those scenes of fantasy which are part of the imaginings of Fando, a 12-year-old boy, who is the film's central figure. There are analogous scenes in *And They Put Handcuffs on Flowers,* but when done by live actors in front of us they do not exert the same force. The immediate fleshed reality makes what we see more of a "show," artificial!

Viva La Muerte takes place during the last days of the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39. We first see Fando (Arrabal was such a boy at the time) as several army jeeps carrying Franco's men ride through the hills proclaiming their imminent victory and shouting their determination to wipe out their enemies, even if it means killing half the country's population. Their battle cry is *"Viva La Muerte!"*

Whether this is factual or not I cannot say, but it sets the tone of the film in a historical sense. The plot itself shows

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Fando, whose father has been arrested and is supposed dead, learning that his mother, fanatically religious, has denounced her husband as an atheist and a "Red." Fando, devoted to his father, tells his mother that when he grows up he too will be an atheist and a "Red." What follows are chiefly the ghastly fantasies of his father's execution and attendant circumstances.

The film, as well as Arrabal's other work (novels, plays, poems), reveals the searing effect of his childhood experiences. There is in it a ferocity without parallel in any other modern dramatist except Genet. Though Arrabal writes in French (which is the language of the film) and lives in Paris, his work is profoundly Spanish. He employs peculiarly Hispanic religious symbols, even in his venomous rejection of the Church. Cruelty, horrendous obscenity, tortured sexuality are all part of his artistic vocabulary. The unconscious in all its polluted flow pours through the spectacle of his imagination. There is no visual metaphor, howsoever repellent, that he spares us. We come away from the film shattered not only by the horrors of the conflict in Spain but by the content of a life warped by everything which preceded that conflict and its psychological after-effects.

I doubt that all the violence which festers in Fando's mind could dwell in a 12-year-old boy's subconscious, but it is certainly in Arrabal's consciousness as an adult. No matter, in *Viva La Muerte* we recognize everything Arrabal hates in the old Spain: the sooty bigotry, the repulsive superstition, the repression of sexual impulse, the backward schooling, the stupid torture in the disciplining of children. The odor of blood and human contamination pervades everything.

The film is divided into photographed scenes showing Fando, his grandfather, mother, aunt, playmates as they exist in reality—some of these have moments of wry humor and charm—including some which explore the quasi-innocent perversions of adolescence; and other scenes, photographed or projected in drawings, in which the facts and fumes of actuality are visualized as the havoc in his soul. The latter compose the most telling parts of the film. The drawings, especially, are conceived in the vein of certain examples of surrealist graphic art in which thoughts are converted into abominably sadistic and scatological visions.

Most surprising and ironical is a little Danish nonsense song that frames the film and in which a child's voice gives vent to confused notions involving shadows and echoes. It is a winningly gay song which suggests that, beside and beyond all the hideous wretchedness we have beheld, there still remains something else and better in life. Anger and hate alone rarely produce anything more than sick or distorted art. *Viva La Muerte* is a picture I am not likely to forget.

Seeing Peter Handke's *The Ride Across Lake Constance* (Forum Theatre of Lincoln Center) reminded me of a conversation I once had with Alfred Stieglitz. I asked him why he had bought (circa 1910) one of the first of Picasso's cubist drawings. "I bought it because I didn't understand it" was Stieglitz's brave reply.

I cannot say that I understood *The Ride Across Lake Constance* (I don't mean to imply that it will prove to possess the value of a Picasso drawing), but I must confess to have been fascinated by this play—or prank.

Peter Handke is a young German dramatist who has already caused something of a stir in his homeland. (I saw one of his shorter plays at the Chelsea Theatre in Brooklyn; several have already been published and others are about to be.) The title of *The Ride Across Lake Constance,* according to the play's translator Michael Roloff, refers to a proverbial German expression designating a situation in which "a person has been in . . . considerable danger and has been unaware of it until afterwards." What I got from the play was a parodistic collage of the conditioned reflexes of folk in "good society," particularly at dinner parties and other such semiformal occasions. There is a puppetlike series of mechanical responses which objectively speaking are altogether absurd, meaningless though habitual. They generally go unnoticed just because of the frequency of their repetition. They are by that very fact socially required.

The result, especially since Handke clothes them in the vestments of old theatre clichés (the ornate host is dressed in what looks like a "toreador" costume), is madly bewildering and frequently quite funny. If you look for a literal meaning in the play you will be lost, frustrated and, lacking a sense of theatrical adventure, angry. It was crazy enough for me to enjoy!

What I could not tell from watching it was how much of its byplay was indicated in the author's text and how much was supplied by the director, Carl Weber. In any case, I found the staging excellent. Dahl Delu's costumes (and make-ups?) are fittingly extravagant, and the cast, especially Stephen Elliott, Keene Curtis, Paul Hecht, Salome Jens and the Howell twins, deserve praise for their commitment and concentration in roles quite out of sight. They act as if all the tomfoolery was unexceptional, indeed wholly normal. □

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Crossword Puzzle No. 1427

FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

1 The type of piano to hold up with dramatic presentation—mainly for the benefit of the spectators. (10,4)
9 First, for example, you have to have a racket, in a manner of speaking. (7)
10 A Minister of Louis XIII, responsible for this in conic form. (7)
11 Some of those things businessmen fight. (5,4)
12 Another name for the nymph Diana. (5)
13 One gate down, and you find it's denied. (7)
15 One might fly along a Roman way to 25, singularly. (7)
16 Uncle Andrew pulled away from it, but left an unwholesome *impression*. (7)
18 The Soviet republic is obviously headed by an ox! (7)
20 Took part in the end of 1 across. (5)
21 A matter of prime concern to railbirds, rather than the N.Y. to Wash. record. (5,4)
23 A full one might be called a bird! (7)
24 Sat peculiarly on the ride this way? (7)
25 You'll never go down if you seek safety this way! (4,2,3,5)

DOWN

1 It covers a multitude, but with one pursuing car, possibly. (5,9)
2 Totaling about 50, and getting things rather confused. (7)
3 Fawn, perhaps, applicable to a poster advertising a late evening ball. (5,10)
4 A lust for the city? (5)
5 A shift of scenery, as needed. (9)
6 Implying part of Irving's work was made with something well-dipped, perhaps. (3,3,3,6)
7 Its main ingredients should make one convinced about soul! (7)
8 How one might cry, being unsympathetic to the loser's tears. (7,7)
14 Is the sculptor, seemingly all done, to make it? (9)
17 Animal on a high mountain, with a tree. (7)
19 Half-a-dozen in the test would still be unimportant. (7)
22 A lot of clothes on Monday, covered with water? (5)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1426

ACROSS: 1 Propound; 5 Static; 10 and 11 Respectability; 12 Inner; 13 Relations; 14 Asset; 16 Ladyship; 19 Alidades; 22 Wells; 24 Decorated; 26 Ostia; 28 Chillon; 29 Assumes; 30 Senora; 31 Emission. DOWN: 1 Parsifal; 2 Orson; 3 Overrated; 4 and 15 Natural selection; 6 Twist; 7 Trinomial; 8 Cayuse; 9 Pallid; 17 Sawhorses; 18 Assassin; 29 Detent; 21 Sidearm; 23 Edicts; 25 Ruler; 27 Tempi.

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

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

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